

Stability And Support Operations, Intervening Armed Forces And The Population They Serve: Defining A Doctrine.

**A Monograph
by
Major Bertrand Darras
French Army
Infantry / Foreign Legion**



**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
First Term AY 01-02**

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Major Bertrand Darras

Title of Monograph: Stability And Support Operations, Intervening Armed Forces And
The Population They Serve: Defining A Doctrine.

Approved by:

William J. A. Miller, COL, USA.

Monograph Director

James K. Greer, COL, USA, MMAS.

Director School
of Advanced
Military Studies

Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

Director, Graduate Degree
Program

Abstract

STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS, INTERVENING ARMED FORCES AND THE POPULATION THEY SERVE: DEFINING A DOCTRINE.

By Major Bertrand Darras, France, 79 pages.

Due to the recent increase in Stability And Support Operations within the framework of Military Operations Other Than War, the local population has been increasingly viewed as a key factor in the success of those operations except in specific cases, such as, noncombatant evacuation operations. In fact, missions designed to enforce or keep peace and to help the population cannot be carried out without the population's support. As a result, both legitimacy and feasibility of the operation depend on the local population. The primary means to achieve success is the relationship established between the local population and the armed forces executing the mission. Failure here leads more or less directly to the overall failure of the mission.

The armed forces of the countries often involved in Stability and Support Operations, for example the United States and France, have considered the need to build effective relationships with the local population. However, two shortfalls are evident: there is no overarching vision regarding how to deal with this relationship and the domains addressed such as Civil Affairs, Information Operation and Public Affairs do not encompass all the means to build an effective relationship.

This monograph will study those relationships between the population and the armed forces, based on American and French experiences. Its purpose is to assess the real and perceived importance of the population in Stability and Support Operations. It evaluate if the creation of a completed body of doctrine in this area is justified and whether it might enable an armed force to take coherent action in regards to its relationship with the local population to successfully fulfill the mission.

This monograph concludes that the local population is an essential actor in the context of Stability and Support Operations. From the first victim of conflict, the population assumes the status of Center of Gravity of the operations in Stability and Support Operations within Military Operations Other Than War. The success of the mission will depend on the population's actions, reactions and capabilities as success depend on the enemy in war. It is obvious that understanding the nature of the relationship existing between the intervening force and the local population is of outmost importance. The behavior of the intervening force takes primary importance in the achievement of the mission. Unfortunately, no doctrine has been realized that deals with this issue. This leads to a lack of mastery of the relationship by military forces. This leads to a lack of mastery of the relationship. Under heavy external constraints, the U.S. Army applies a method intended to decrease risk but also lessens influence. Under traditional and cultural constraints, the French Army applies a method that fosters influence but incurs greater risks. Both, the U.S. and the French Armies, while using different approaches, are applying methods that have numerous defects and lead to lost opportunities and efficiency. In this situation, a doctrine could help define the issue and should enable solutions to eliminate or reduce those shortfalls. The doctrine is needed. It is feasible, because all the necessary material exists, but not before some extensive work is done. A synthesis of science, history and experience related to the issue has to be created. The strategy for Stability and Support Operations must be clearly stated. Only then, will adapted principles and concepts appear and from them doctrine will evolve.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION.....	6
II. LOCAL POPULATION IS MOST OF THE TIME THE KEY ACTOR IN STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS.	10
III. UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LOCAL POPULATION AND THE INTERVENING FORCE IS ESSENTIAL.....	18
IV. CONSIDERING THE INTERVENING FORCE’S ATTITUDE AND BEHAVIOR IS A NECESSITY.....	28
V. THE LACK OF A COMPREHENSIVE DOCTRINE IN THE U.S. AND FRENCH ARMIES.	34
VI. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. ARMY METHOD OF OPERATION.....	41
VII. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE FRENCH ARMY METHOD OF OPERATION.....	48
VIII. DOCTRINE: THE NEED AND FEASIBILITY.	54
IX. CONCLUSION	61
APPENDIX I: GLOSSARY.....	67
APPENDIX II: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AN INTERVENING FORCE AND THE LOCAL POPULACE, AND DOCTRINE.....	69
APPENDIX III: MODELS OF UNDERSTANDING AND ANALYZING A RELATIONSHIP.	70
APPENDIX IV: ELEMENTS OF THEORY FOR THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE POPULATION.....	72
BIBLIOGRAPHY	75

TABLE OF FIGURES

<u>Figure 1 Complexity of the distribution of population in Bosnia.....</u>	15
<u>Figure 2 The relationship between influence and interactions.....</u>	29
<u>Figure 3 The road for development of doctrine.</u>	54
<u>Figure 4 The way enemy, population and other component of the environment should fit within the scope of military operations according to the U.S. doctrine.....</u>	56
<u>Figure 5 The way enemy, population and other component of the environment should fit within the scope of military operations according to the French doctrine.....</u>	57
<u>Figure 6 The current civil-military operations doctrinal environment and a possible adaptation.</u>	65

I. INTRODUCTION

Military doctrine is the bridge between thoughts and action.

John Gooch, *Military Doctrine And Military History in The Origins Of Contemporary Doctrine*

Every soldier is a spokesperson.

FM 100-23 Peace operations

Méditez le proverbe Afar – Arabe en fait – que m’a conté, forces gestes à l’appui, un vieil Afar à Assa Gayla, il y a de longues années : « Si tu veux me montrer la considération que tu as pour moi tout en m’aidant, ne fait plus ce geste : la main qui donne est toujours au dessus de la main qui reçoit, fait celui-là : la main qui offre, spontanément, généreusement, humainement, est toujours au-dessous de la main qui choisit et prends... tu as compris ? C’est toujours ainsi qu’il te faudra agir ».

Reflect on this Afar proverb – which is Arab – related to me, while Using many gestures to express himself, an old Afar in Assa Gayla, many years ago: “If you want to show me respect while helping me, don’t do this gesture again: the hand that gives is over the hand that receives, instead do this: the hand that offers spontaneously, generously, humanely is always under the hand that chooses and takes... do you understand? This is the way you should always act.”

Général Roques, Ret, French Army, *Les interventions militaires Françaises en Afrique*

Due to the recent increase in Stability and Support Operations within the framework of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW),¹ the local population² has been increasingly viewed as a key factor in the success of those operations except in specific cases, such as, noncombatant evacuation operations. In fact, missions designed to enforce or keep peace and aid the population cannot be carried out without the population’s support. For obvious reasons, the armed forces cannot fight against the population they came to help. Therefore, if a clear majority of the population is against a foreign intervention, legitimacy is lost and the operation can be viewed as infeasible. The fact that the opinion of the local population is extremely difficult to

¹See Figure 1.1 in US Army, *FM 3-0, Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2001) and Figure 7 page 47.

²In the author’s view the local population encompasses not only the individuals, whatever their rank in the society, but also organizations within it.

assess and, in most cases, the troops are deployed before any detailed assessment can be made, further complicates the issue.

As a result, both legitimacy and feasibility of the operation must be built during its execution. The primary means is the positive relationship established between the local population and the armed forces executing the mission. The importance of this relationship in setting the conditions for the success of the mission cannot be underestimated. Failure here leads, more or less directly, to the overall failure of the mission. The process of creating this particular relationship seems no different from any other process of creating a relationship, except that the environment in which it must be created is usually defined by suffering and violence instead of trust and confidence.

The armed forces of the countries often involved in Stability and Support Operations, for example the United States and France, have considered the need to build effective relationships with the local population. Doctrine for Information Operations (IO), Public Affairs (PA), Civil Affairs (CA) and Civil-Military Operations (CMO) has been directly and indirectly developed within this framework. Each of these doctrines deals with a particular domain of the relationship with the population: education and information, communication, and material assistance.

However, two shortfalls are evident: there is no overarching vision regarding how to deal with this relationship and the domains addressed do not encompass all the means to build an effective relationship. The support a local population demonstrates for an operation is not only influenced by ideas, as expressed in the media, but also by food distribution and infrastructure improvement. It is also highly dependant on the people's perception of the intervening armed forces and the purpose of the mission. This perception is fostered through daily contacts at all levels of the society with the members of the force conducting the Stability and Support Operation and through the integration of the different domains listed above.

The relationship between a local population and an armed force conducting a Stability and Support mission is not covered by any unifying doctrine. This deficiency is important because the contacts between the population and the armed forces occur daily and encompass the majority of

the population. Hence, the effects created by those interactions are constant, pervasive, and powerful. They are defined by the words, the deeds and the attitude of all members of the intervening force from the private in the field to leaders at home. As a result, words, deeds and attitudes provide the bedrock upon which Information Operations, Civil Affairs and Public Affairs efforts are based. If the military leader fails to take into account the agenda of the population and the nature of the society his force will encounter, or if a soldier on the ground acts inappropriately, or if the force loses the confidence of the local population, then no matter how grand or complex the information operation, robust the public affairs effort or massive the civil affairs push, the operation is doomed to a slow and perhaps ugly demise.

This monograph will study those relationships between the population and the armed forces, based on American and French experiences. Its purpose is to assess the real and perceived importance of the population in Stability and Support Operations. It will evaluate if the creation of a completed body of doctrine in this area is justified and whether it might enable an armed force to take coherent action in regards to its relationship with the local population to successfully fulfill the mission.

This monograph contains nine sections. After this brief introduction, Chapter II, **Local Population Is The Key Actor In Stability and Support Operations** demonstrates the importance of local population. Chapter III, **Understanding The Nature Of The Relationship Between The Local Population And The Intervening Force**, emphasizes that this relationship has a nature of its own which follow the rules of the science of sociology. Chapter IV, **Taking The Intervening Force's Attitude And Behavior Into Account Is A Necessity**, discusses the role of this behavior in the relationship. Chapter V, **The Lack Of A Comprehensive Doctrine In The U.S. And French Armies**, evaluates the consequences of the lack of doctrine dealing with this issue. Chapter VI, **An Assessment Of The U.S. Army Method Of Operation**, describes and assesses the advantages and disadvantages of the U.S. ARMY method of coping with this issue. Chapter VII, **An Assessment Of The French Army Method Of Operation**, describes and

assesses the same issue for the French Army as examined for the U.S. Army in the previous chapter. Chapter VIII, **Doctrine: The Need And Feasibility**, demonstrate the need and feasibility of the doctrine. The final Chapter, **Conclusions**, provides guidance and recommendations on the content of this body of doctrine and where it should fit in the American doctrinal scheme.

II. LOCAL POPULATION IS MOST OF THE TIME THE KEY ACTOR IN STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS.

The local population is a key actor of Stability and Support Operations. Members of foreign armed forces cannot avoid shaping the perception of the mission, and so working for or against its success, through their relationship with the population. To be successful, an intervening force must understand the particulars of the relationship they have with the local population and the importance it has in the accomplishment of the mission.

In many current conflicts, the local population is the principal victim, both physically and morally. The United Nations (UN) estimates that civilians represented 5% of the victims in conflict during the First World War and 90% in 1990.³ The increasing capability of the western world to move information enable the international community to be aware of violence exerted against civilians virtually instantaneously. This awareness amplifies the motivation to intervene for two reasons. First, because of transnational populations and cultural solidarities, a local conflict can evolve into an international one and lead to further destabilization. Second, because when a conflict takes root within a population, it inflames the hatred between opposing groups pushing them further apart, thus lengthening the duration of the conflict and increasing civilian casualties. This result is intolerable in the eyes of the international public and as a result some states become willing to act to stop this dynamic.

The consequences of this increase in the number of civilian victims and the international awareness of their plight are so powerful that it managed to threaten the charter of the United

³United Nations. Press Communiqué (22nd February 1999)[database online], available from <http://www.un.org/News/fr-press/docs/1999/19990222.cs1027.html>; Internet. This increase is due to the development of deep striking weapons combined with the concept of total war and will lead to the bombardments of Coventry (GB), Dresden (Germany) and Nagasaki and Hiroshima (Japan) during World War II. Another reason is the reappearance of ideological wars (nazism, fascism, communism against the free world, religious wars) that had nearly disappeared after the end of the religious wars in Europe symbolized by the Treaty of Westphalia (1648). Finally the decolonization did bring its share of instability and conflicts.

Nations by bringing forward the notion of right or duty of interference based on moral grounds.⁴ This notion goes against the previous doctrines that either state or imply that the sovereignty of a state is the prime principle around which the nations have organized themselves and their relations between one another.

As a result, the local population has moved from a status of simple victim of the conflict to one of “means” within the conflict in the hands of the dominant actors.⁵ In other words, the population can be overtly used as a pawn to obtain a desired end. There are a number of examples of this. Depending of the type of conflict, the local population can either be chased from its homes as in the Former Yugoslavia, or starved to death like in southern Sudan. It can be further used for sanctuary or as an asymmetric force against any foreign forces or as a combination of both, for example General Aideed’s operations in Somalia in 1993 during United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II).

The purpose of using the population differs from case to case. It can range from denying any support to an adversary, retaining freedom of action or attacking the legitimacy of a foreign intervention. In Somalia, again, the withdrawal of U.N. forces after the operation in Mogadishu that ended with eighteen U.S. casualties was not due to the so called “casualty aversion” U.S. forces embrace but more to the perception by the U.S. public opinion that the Somalis did not want their presence anymore.⁶

It appears clear that the participant who gains the support of the local population will secure either a great force multiplier or even the ultimate means to achieve their goals depending on the operation. The status of victim and means ascribed to the local population will create, in turn, a

⁴United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, Chapter 1, Article 2 [database online], available from <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>; Internet.

⁵Lieutenant-colonel Chauvancy, Le moral du soldat occidental dans les nouveaux contextes d’intervention » (The Western Soldier Moral In The New Intervention Environment). *MARS* 166, Third trimester 2000, 53.

⁶Steven Kull, What New Isolationism? Wrong, Pundits. We Still Feel a Global Duty, Even in Somalia, *The Washington Post*, 24 October 1993. The results of a poll by the Washington Post in October 1993 demonstrates that 54% of US respondents thought UN forces should stay in Somalia if the majority of the Somalis wanted UN help. However, 58% of those respondents had the feeling that the Somalis did not want it.

new dynamic: the local population, as cause or reason for a foreign intervention. Whether U.N., coalition or a nationally led operation with the U.N. approval, the reason put forward to get the public support for an intervention is the same: the intervention is morally justified because the population's suffering has to be stopped. It does not, however, mean that other reasons to intervene are absent, e.g. national interest, obligation to enforce international laws, protection of citizens, etc. They are, in fact, the basis of the political decision. Without these other considerations, there might well be no intervention at all as in the case of Rwanda in 1994. However, in Military Operations Other Than War, the public opinion of democracies like the United States and France has to be marshaled by the way of the moral necessity to act in order to support virtually any operation.

The duty to assist endangered persons is invoked via the concept of moral action or the need to do what is right. Most western countries are obliged to intervene as a result of their support of the Universal Human Rights Charter, embedded in the U.N. constitution, which has been a pillar of western foreign policy since World War II. The necessity to pursue this policy of intervention in support of human rights is exacerbated through the pressure of national public opinion. Public opinion, or at least the influential part of it, when informed by the media about a situation and molded by an education and culture steeped in the concepts of tolerance and respect for human life, exerts a pressure on governments to intervene. In June 1996, the results of a poll in France show that 82 % of the population would approve a French intervention to help a population in distress.⁷ In fact, for the United States and France, not acting undermines the support to the concept of human rights worldwide and thus the coherence of their strategy as described in both the National Security Strategy for the United States, and the "Livre Blanc Sur La Défense, 1994", in English Report on Defense, 1994, for France.⁸ So, even if other reasons, i.e. political or

⁷Edited by Louis Balmond, *Les interventions militaires françaises en Afrique* (French Military Intervention In Africa) (Paris : Editions A. Pedone, 1998), 116.

⁸The White House, *A National security strategy For a New Century* (The White House: Washington, 1999), 26. Gouvernement Français, *Livre Blanc sur la Défense 1994* (Report on Defense, 1994) (Paris : Editions 10/18, 1994), 50-51.

economical, are hidden behind “moral” reasons, the “moral” reasons being the “official” reasons to act. They become the keystone of the legitimacy of the operation. Without question, the majority of “moral” reasons to intervene will be based upon the suffering of the local population. Failure to act quickly and decisively, in the light of western society’s sense of duty and morality, when facing an overwhelming disaster or imminent human suffering, can precipitate enormous ill-will and challenge the moral authority of governments as it did for the United States and France during the Rwanda crisis.⁹

In the process described above, the local population attains a different status. Its fate and well being have now become the basis for establishing the legitimacy of the Stability and Support Operations.¹⁰ When innocent populations face a disaster, western countries are morally compelled to act by the pressure of national and international public opinion. However, the affected population cannot be forced to accept help. Additionally, it is clear that when acting in support or defense of the local population, an intervening force will only stay if the former accepts its presence. Furthermore, the American experience in Somalia shows that legitimacy may not necessarily be based on the will of the entire population. In reality, the will of a group or groups within the population, such as the Aideed clan, that controlled a key terrain (Mogadishu) was sufficient to challenge the legitimacy of the operation.¹¹ Therefore, even a small yet influential segment of the local population can be a sensitive base for the legitimacy of an intervention.

Given the discussion above, if the population is all at once the key actor, i.e., a victim; a means; a cause for an intervention; and the root of legitimacy in Stability and Support Operations, then it is the subject of the operation in Military Operation Other Than War in a way that is analogous to the enemy in a conventional combat operation. Therefore, the population must be well understood, because it is through a thorough understanding that the force can set the

⁹Samantha Power, Bystanders To Genocide, *The Atlantic Monthly* 288, no 2 (September 2001): 84–108.

¹⁰US Army, *FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces* (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1999), 3-19.

¹¹Steven Kull, What New Isolationism? Wrong, Pundits. We Still Feel a Global Duty, Even in Somalia, *The Washington Post*, 24 October 1993.

conditions for positive and influential relationship with a complex, unique and always decisive actor.

Understanding a local population is difficult for many reasons. The complexity of the situation is further exacerbated by the fact that there is often little information available about the countries where the intervention might occur and hence little opportunity for soldiers and leaders to gain an understanding of the culture within which they will operate. The ability to understand the complexity of the situation becomes even more difficult when one takes in account the differences in culture, values and standard of life between the intervening force and the local population.

The social asymmetry between the local population and the force implementing the Stability and Support Operations is yet another aggravating factor. Both are social groups of a very different nature.¹² The intervening force is a hierarchical, coherent and disciplined group. It is a formal group.¹³ Because of its military nature, it seeks concentration in space and time, short duration operations and “unity of purpose”. The population, on the other hand, is geographically dispersed and maintains permanence in its settlements. While, in certain conditions, a belligerent can rapidly inflame the passion of the population, the later is more sensitive to long-term influence than to short-term effects when dealing with an intervening force. It is inherently unstable, largely without a sustainable coherence and is most often a collection of intermixed social, political, familial, religious and, or cultural groups.

Each of these groups pursues its own goals and adopts its own attitudes and policies toward the intervening force. Those activities and policies can range from overtly friendly to violently opposed. When supporting a belligerent faction against the foreign force conducting the Stability and Support Operation, these groups can work as an asymmetrical fighter like the Aideed clan in Somalia. Meanwhile, another group can be hostile and follow another agenda, yet another can be

¹²George A.Theodorson and Achilles G. Theodorson, *A Modern Dictionary of Sociology*, (New York: Thomas Y Cromwell Company, 1969), 176.

¹³Ibid, 177.

neutral and another can support the operation both politically and materially. The population reacts differently from one situation to another. In theory it is a group, but a different kind of group depending on the theater of operation. In such an environment, understanding the population and its components and establishing a simple clear-cut relationship is not an easy task.

The local population is a complex actor because it is never uniform ethnically, socially, religiously, politically and culturally in a given geographical space. Most population lacks any real homogeneity. The potential intermixing of those groups further complicates the issue. A map (Figure 1) of the distribution of the Serb, Croat and Muslim population in Bosnia before the war in 1991 depicts an example of this problem.¹⁴



Figure 1 Complexity of the distribution of population in Bosnia.

¹⁴Jeremy Crampton, *Ethnic Majority Areas In Bosnia-Herzegovina*, available from <http://www.ccp.caltech.edu/~bosnia/status/census.html>; Internet.

The lack of the local population support makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the intervening force to succeed in its mission. If the goals and interests of the population do not match those of the intervening force, for example in Mogadishu, then the intervening force will find it very difficult to operate against belligerent forces, such as those of Aideed. Furthermore, the more disparate the view as to objectives and goals between the population and the force, the less likely it will be that the mission will be of short duration as hypothesized but not realized in Bosnia and Kosovo. In the first example, the combination of Aideed's ability to hide in the population and the perception on behalf of the international public opinion that the Somalis no longer desired a U.N. presence, led to the withdrawal in late 1993. In the second example, in the Balkans, as long as an important and influential part of the local population is supporting the war, it is clear that the withdrawal of the intervening force will be the sign for a violent out break that might evolve into another conflict. Lack of legitimacy, asymmetry, and sensitivity only to long-term influence renders any success in Stability and Support Operations hard to achieve in a limited period of time. Long-term commitments are exactly the opposite of what intervening forces and their government seek when intervening in the affairs of other nations and states.¹⁵

Regardless of how difficult it is to cope with the local population, it remains a key factor in the Stability and Support Operations to the point where it can often be considered the operation's center of gravity.¹⁶ It is the key factor for the belligerents because it can, both materially and physically, support and reinforce them and because it is the means to undermine the legitimacy of an intervention. The belligerent derives its freedom of action and physical strength from it.

Fortunately, history has demonstrated that the local population is often supportive of the intervention in the beginning. When this condition holds true, success can be achieved rapidly, as the example of Operation Restore Hope in 1992-1993 in Somalia and Operation "Turquoise"

¹⁵FM 46-1, Public Affairs operations states page 6: "The mission of the United States Army is to protect and defend the Constitution of the United States of America by deterring war, and when deterrence fails, by achieving quick, decisive victory - on and off the battlefield - anywhere in the world and under virtually any conditions."

(French-African) in 1994 in Southwest Rwanda shows.¹⁷ Those two operations were, in the main, nearly entirely humanitarian in nature and designed to address an emergency situation, thus meeting minimal opposition within the local population at the beginning. It took six months (9 December 1992 – 4 May 1993) to declare Restore Hope successful and the French withdrew their forces from Southwest Rwanda after only three and a half months (18 June 1994 – 30 September 1994) of operation. The fact that the purposes of those operations were closely allied with the interests of the people explains the rapid success of the operations.

To summarize, the civilian population is the first victim of today's conflicts. It is additionally often a means in the conflict. As a result, it becomes the cause for an intervention and the legitimacy of this intervention will be based on its perceived needs and acceptance of help. The intervening force and the belligerents or other groups opposed to the operation will have to compete for the support of the local population in order to obtain and maintain the requisite legitimacy to operate effectively. The establishment of legitimacy is the key to success and legitimacy is defined by the population's perceptions and action in regards to the intervening force. The population often becomes an operational if not a strategic center of gravity in Military Operations Other Than War. The local population is a key and very complex actor in Stability and Support Operations. It attains the level of importance of the enemy in combat. It is hard to understand and to cope with, but it is essential to the success of the mission. Therefore, the nature of the relationship between the population and the intervening force must be well understood, just as the nature of the enemy and its relationship to the friendly force must be well understood in combat.

¹⁶“Centers of Gravity are those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight.” US Army, *FM 3-0, Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2001), 5-7.

¹⁷Restore Hope: Name of the Operation following the UN Resolution 794 of the 3 December 1992, which intended to provide security for humanitarian relief supplies in Somalia. On the 4 May 1993 Operation Restore Hope ended and UNOSOM II started to end in failure a few month latter. Turquoise: name of the Operation following the UN Resolution 929, which intended to provide security for humanitarian relief supplies for the Hutus refugees in Rwanda.

III. UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LOCAL POPULATION AND THE INTERVENING FORCE IS ESSENTIAL.

If the relationship between an intervening force and the enemy can be described in the realm of physics and human science, then the relationship between an intervening force and the local population may fit within the realm of sociology.

In order to further describe the relationship, concepts taken from the study of sociology are necessary. According to George A. and Achilles G. Theodorson, sociology is “the scientific study of human social behavior. Sociology studies the processes and patterns of individual and group interaction, the forms of organization of social groups, the relationship among them...”¹⁸ In order to analyze the relationship within the realm of sociology, the intervening force and the local population must fit within the definition of a group and have interactions. The same authors give the following definition of a social group:” A plurality of persons who have a common identity, at least some feeling of unity, and certain common goals and shared norms.”¹⁹ It is not necessary to go deeper to see that an armed force fits in this definition. The local population also fits as well, even if it lacks unity like in Bosnia, where it is composed of several social groups (Serbs, Croats and Bosnians). The definition of social interaction is: “The basic social process represented in communication and a mutual relationship between two or more individuals (or groups)...”²⁰ Here again, it is clear that the relationship between the two groups fits the definition.

Max Weber defines sociology as: “a situation where two or more persons are engaged in conduct wherein each takes account of the behavior of the other in a meaningful way and is therefore oriented in these terms.”²¹ The first condition is naturally met when the two social groups, the local population and the force, are in contact. It is also clear that a force, which comes

¹⁸George A.Theodorson and Achilles G. Theodorson, *A Modern Dictionary of Sociology*, (New York: Thomas Y Cromwell Company, 1969), 401.

¹⁹Ibid., 176.

²⁰Ibid., 211.

²¹Max Weber, *Basic Concepts In Sociology*, (Westport Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Publishers 1962), 63.

in order to help the population, takes in account the behavior of the population just as the population takes in account the one of the force. To investigate the nature of the description of the relationship between the population and the force, the remnant of the chapter will focus on five patterns: environment of the relationship, interest, asymmetry, dependence and domination.²²

Environment.

The relationship can be characterized as being under strong pressures from many different environmental factors. As a result, the intervening force has its freedom of action limited from the beginning, not so much due to the nature of its opponent but rather due to environmental factors. Several factors further define the environment. These factors are political, legal, cultural and military in nature. They are not separate and distinct in their influence on the situation. They produce a dynamic effect; a mixture of constraints that the intervening force has to deal with.

Political factor.

Political constraints are related to the perception of the operation, through the prism of the media and of polls, by the political leaders based on the state of the national public opinion or of the influential sphere.²³ The central issue is that if an incident occurs that damages the relationship between the local population and the force or if the force involved does not act according to the values of their nation, then the mission will be endangered. Historically, public opinion at home, under these conditions, can rapidly turn against the mission either because of an increased aversion to casualties or a perceived lack of legitimacy or both. Should this happen, the chances increase dramatically that the political leadership will cancel the mission. A prime example of this process is the one that drove to the withdrawal from Somalia in 1993. After the operation in Mogadishu in October 1993 that resulted in eighteen U.S. soldiers killed in action, the U.S. political leadership, hence the U.N. decided to pull out even though, according to polls

²²From his readings, the author concluded that those five patterns are essential to understand the relationship. Other patterns can be found.

²³“Influential sphere” includes the media, scholars, intellectuals, political parties and lobbies or those that holds an extraordinary impact on the shaping of opinion or public policy in the author’s view.

done later, the U.S. population was ready to go further.²⁴ The impact of these types of constraints are such that they will: shape both the type and scope of tasks assigned to intervening troops, and the command relationship; and define the Rules of Behavior (ROB),²⁵ to include the rules of engagement under which the intervening force will operate.

Legal factor.

Legal constraints that influence an intervention come from different sources. Both, national and international laws and agreements, e.g. Geneva Conventions, constrain the relationship between the local population and the intervening force. In most cases, the soldier is bound by the laws of his country and international laws. The local population, however, generally lives under a different legal system and in some cases, for example Somalia, a failed state, there is no legal system at all. Status Of Force Agreements (SOFA), which, if in place, define the soldiers' legal status, also generally bind the intervening forces. The above conditions effectively limit an intervening force and its soldiers' freedom of action. At the same time, a potential opponent or a hostile group belonging to the local population is generally not restricted by the same issues and may retain its freedom of action if supported by the population.

Cultural factor.

This trend of limiting the soldiers' freedom of behavior is further reinforced by the constraints derived from the intervening nation's culture and values. Even if it is a subjective issue, a soldier, hence the force, often finds it difficult to betray the values of the society he represents. There are noted exceptions where soldiers have committed atrocities, e.g. My Lai in Viet Nam and torture during the Algerian war, but by and large, soldier tend to act within the moral constraints imposed by their culture and values. Acting against these norms would begin the process of destroying the legitimacy of the operation in the eyes of the soldiers' people and

²⁴Steven Kull, What New Isolationism? Wrong, Pundits. We Still Feel a Global Duty, Even in Somalia, *The Washington Post*, 24 October 1993; Charles K. Hyde, "Casualty Aversion", *Aerospace Power journal*, Summer 2000.

²⁵US Army, *FM 100-20, Military Operations In Low Intensity Conflict*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1990), 1-9.

government. Public opinion would turn rapidly against the operation. Therefore, the fact remains that soldiers are further constrained in the competition to gain the support of the local population by their own cultural imperatives, while their opponents are in all likelihood free from the same constraints.

Another contributor to the potential cultural divide can be the imposed separation of the intervening force from the population. An important gap between the standard of life of the intervening force and the local population constrains or restricts the relationship between the two. For instance, the force might not be allowed to purchase food from the population and the soldier might even be forced to refuse to drink something with any local inhabitants for sanitary reasons. This trend is further reinforced when an intervening force habitually brings with it from its home country all the assets needed to maintain standard of life.²⁶ This will diminish the opportunities to make contact and negatively influence the perception developed by the population because the force will tend to focus inwards in order to meet the needs. This behavior can be perceived as an insult. As General Roques put it “On ne peut aider que lorsqu’on respecte” in English, one can only help when one respects the other.²⁷ As a result, soldiers of the intervening force are not encouraged to gain and maintain contact with the local population, further limiting their opportunities to establish an atmosphere of trust and gain valuable intelligence about the area and its problems.

Military factor.

Finally, the military organization should be the least constraining. In fact, however, it often is not. Military professionals espouse as a basic principle the requirement to retain freedom of action when executing an operation. However, in the case of establishing a relationship with the local population, it seems that the armed forces themselves limit this freedom. Rules of

²⁶Harriet E. Rice, Recreation Downrange: Army MWR Delivers, *Parks And Recreation*, December 1998; US Army, *FM 12-6, Personnel Doctrine*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2001), 7-1.

²⁷Edited by Louis Balmond, *Les interventions militaires françaises en Afrique* (French Military Intervention In Africa) (Paris: Editions A. Pedone, 1998), 145.

engagement, the mission statement, the purpose when it is opposed to the interest of the population, doctrine or lack thereof and interoperability issues, all exacerbate this relationship. Rules of engagement are necessary. However, they should not only take in account the protection of the force and higher level's directives, they should also be developed based on how the local population will perceive their implementation. If not, they might become another constraint on the ability of the force to develop good relationships with the local inhabitants.²⁸ The constraints, imposed by the mission statement and purpose, are usually more categorical. A mission, where the purpose runs counter to the expectations, desires and/or agenda of the majority or the most influential part of the population, is likely to fail. The soldier or the unit conducting the operation then must accomplish a mission that relies, for its success, on the development of good relationship, but establishing a workable relationship becomes impossible because the population holds a negative perception of the mission. This is one of the dilemmas that the Kosovo Force (KFOR) deals with in Kosovo. Albanians Kosovars desire independence and Serbian Kosovars desire to remain under the control of Serbia proper, neither of which KFOR can support.

Thus, it appears that the relationships between the local population and the intervening force are under the pressure of environmental constraints that are: not directly related to them; not fully understood in their consequences, i.e. second and third order effect; and nearly systematic in their ability to undermine the efforts and abilities of the intervening force to develop them. All those constraints are interrelated in a complex system that values each constraint differently depending on the situation. What is common among these constraints is that they are usually open and public knowledge. As a result, opponents of an intervention can use these constraints to their advantage because they know the limitations under which the intervening force must operate. Yet, at the same time, the intervening force has little knowledge as of the constraints under which their

²⁸ Commandant Franchet, *Casque bleu pour rien, ce que j'ai vraiment vu en Bosnie* (Blue Helmet For Nothing, What I Really Saw In Bosnia), (Paris: Editions JC Lattes, 1995), 122. In this case, Commandant Franchet explains how their highest commander denied U.N. soldiers the right to interfere in obvious inhumane actions taken by belligerents against civilians because of Rules of Engagements' interpretation.

opponents must operate. At the beginning of the game, the opponents start with their cards face down and the intervening force begins with most of their cards face up.

Interest.

The relationship is obviously interest-based in nature. The characteristics of each side's interests are different. The intervening force has an interest that remains fairly stable from one Stability and Support Operation to another. The local population has interests that can vary widely depending on the situation from mission to mission.

The actors involved in a conflict have "official" and very often hidden agendas. Those agendas are based on needs and purposes that are synthesized into interests. The combination of these interests has a direct impact on the relationship between the intervening force and the local population. Belligerents, for instance, will try to use the local population to gain support politically, economically and morally. Each state involved in the intervening force will attempt to advance its own agenda. These agenda are usually defined by the search for success, based on the political and economic position each actor wants to hold at the end of the conflict as well as the level of international credibility it wants to achieve.²⁹

²⁹France, Assemblée Nationale, Commission de la Défense Nationale et des Forces Armées, *Les actions civilo-militaires, de l'urgence au développement : quels outils pour la France ?* (Civil-Military Actions, From Emergency To Development: Which Tool For France), (Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 2001), 83. For example, in 2000, the United Nation Interim Administration In Kosovo (UNMIK) is composed of 12,6 % of American, 4,71% British and 3,23 % French personnel. The UNMIK being the administration of Kosovo will be the deciding factor in structuring potential economic markets as the country is rebuilt. Meanwhile, the United States provides 4900 soldiers, France 4500 and Great Britain 3017. So the representation in UNMIK of the three countries do not match the size of the force they provide to the operation This is the author assertion that the process might have been the following: at the time the negotiation took place, the United States because they were the country that had provided the majority of the assets for the air campaign over Former Yugoslavia, were entitled to claim such a representation. By taking the area of operation south east of Kosovo, it controls the area in the Balkans where the next trouble could raise and so, the further development of the crisis: Macedonia. Great Britain, asking and taking the lead for the entry operation, is also entitled to claim more representation than others. Its purpose is to obtain credit for successfully driving the Serbian Army out of Kosovo at the time Europe is negotiating the creation of a European force, and to get the freedom of choosing as their area of operation the center of Kosovo where the capital of the province is located and the political heart center will remain. To balance this and knowing that its representation in the UNMIK does not match the size of the force provided, France sought the economically richest area of operation, which is also one where the Serbian population is still

In terms of its relationship with the local population, the intervening force has a prime interest: get the local population to support the force and its mission, or at least ensure its neutrality toward the mission and the force. The fact that the population is often diverse in its interests and possesses little incentive to work as a single group makes it virtually impossible for the intervening force to please all people in all situations. The intervening force might be obliged to use different means and methods to accomplish its mission based on the perceptions and interests of different groups within the population. As a result, it becomes more important that the force obtains freedom of action in the relationship to reach the required level of flexibility and efficiency. This positive relationship will then become a true force multiplier for the military force or be the essential means to satisfy the purpose of the operation. A positive relationship with the population: enhances the ability to gather information; protect the force; increases the credibility toward the media; indirectly, lifts some political pressure on the commander; raises the moral of soldiers who will see the direct result of his work,³⁰ and weakens the influence of any extremist or belligerent opposed to the operation.

The interests of the local population vary both within and according to the situation. There is always a material interest due to hardship imposed by the conflict. The cultural and political interests can be extremely diverse. They are often the most powerful factors that divide a local population. It is usually these interests that drive the local population to oppose the intervening force or support it depending on the congruence of purpose of the actors. In other words: do they see the intervention as a good thing? In general, the local population reacts quickly, according to its perception of the influence of the operation on its interests. The population is sensitive to the congruence of purpose in the short term. Beyond this and more often, the population will be

largely present. As a result, France might have a better chance of obtaining the rebuilding contract for the mining region in northern Kosovo and favorable consideration by the Serbian government when it signs agreements to rebuild its economy. Other factors might have entered the result of the negotiation about assignment of offices within the UNMIK, but economic interests, credibility and political influence were surely one of the predominant reasons.

³⁰Laura L. Miller and Charles Moskos, Humanitarians or warriors?: Race, Gender, And Combat Status In operation restore Hope, *Armed Forces and society*, Summer 1995.

sensitive to the perception of the intervening force in the mid and long term. Additionally, the various groups within the local population are continually trying to gain as much advantage, politically and economically, as they can from each of the different actors involved.³¹ The impacts of those agenda on the relationship are situationally dependant. However, they nearly always constitute a complex system, in which all actors of the conflict have their part. So, the ability of the intervening force to control the nature of the relationship in order to support its goals is further complicated.

Within the complex system of relationships that defines the group of actors involved in Stability and Support Operations, both the intervening force and the local population will adopt an attitude that seeks to enable them to meet their interests. The population will support the force to get material help but might oppose it or use it to get political advantage. The intervening force will be eager to answer the needs of the population or to make sure that other agencies can do so while at the same time advancing the interests of their country. However, environmental constraints and interests are not the only characteristics of the relationship. It is also an asymmetrical relation of dependence and domination.

Asymmetry.

The intervening force and the local population are involved in a socially asymmetrical relationship. Max Weber defines it by: “all parties who are mutually oriented in a given social relationship do not necessarily manifest the same subjective meaning about it... To the parties involved, their conduct merely shows various forms and meanings, and the social relationship is simply “asymmetrical”.”³² The difference in the nature of the parties involved as a social group, the differences in standard and way of life, in structure and aim obviously, render the relation asymmetrical whether it is a competitive or a cooperative one. The relationship of dependence and domination is by its very nature asymmetrical. As dependence increases on one side, power

³¹Commandant Franchet, *Casque Bleu Pour Rien, Ce Que j’ai Vraiment Vu En Bosnie*, (Paris : Editions JC Lattes, 1995), 16.

³²Max Weber, *Basic Concepts In Sociology*, (Westport Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Publishers 1962), 64.

accumulates to the other side. Yet, it is not linear in that there are different types of dependence and domination, e.g. information, economy and strength, that can be accumulated and wielded by one side or the other and often they have the ability to mitigate the effect of one another.

Dependence.

The relationship is one of dependence, because the interest of each actors is inextricably linked to the behavior of the other actors. In most cases, they need each other to achieve their goal: support, help or security. Even the goals can be interdependent. For example, the local population may be looking for better security to improve its living conditions while the force is fulfilling a part of its mission by enforcing security. When there is a congruence of interests, execution of the mission is far easier for the intervening force. However, it appears that when there is a lack of dependence like in the case of the Aideed clan in Mogadishu in 1993, the mission becomes much more difficult. The local population, in Mogadishu, did not starve and relied on the clan for its protection and furthering its interests more so than on the intervening force.³³

Domination.

The relation of domination is based on the nature of Stability and Support Operations.³⁴ A relation of domination is defined as one in which a party has “ the opportunity to have a command of a given specified content obeyed by a given group of persons.”³⁵ This is clearly the case of an intervening force in term of military force. This ability to dominate one side may not fully rest within the military domain of power. Often in Stability and Support Operation, the ability to dominate the issues and their understanding lies within the domain of information, economy and even diplomacy. As a result, the relation of domination can be best assessed by a comprehensive analysis of the aforementioned domains, which often bound the ability of one side

³³For a short presentation of the Somali society see: Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995), 12-13.

³⁴US Army, *FM 3-0, Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2001), 9-2.

³⁵Max Weber, *Basic Concepts In Sociology*, (Westport Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Publishers 1962), 117.

or another to dominate the relationship. The intervening force must understand this relationship and conduct such an analysis if it wants to successfully operate from a position of dominance.

Thus, the relationship between the intervening force and the local population belongs in the realm of sociology. It can be described, analyzed and understood through it. It fits to its patterns and to the following components: relationship, social group and interaction and therefore behavior. The patterns that describe the relationship are: environmental constraints, interest based, asymmetry, dependence and domination. As a result, it is necessary for the force preparing to intervene in a Stability and Support Operation to thoughtfully and extensively gain an understanding of the factors that will ultimately influence the relationship with the local population.

IV. CONSIDERING THE INTERVENING FORCE'S ATTITUDE AND BEHAVIOR IS A NECESSITY.

Social behaviorism is “a theoretical position within sociology that views the individual and his interaction with other individuals as the basic unit of social analysis.”³⁶ In the relationship between the local population and an intervening force, the population is of utmost importance to the latter, if it is to accomplish the mission. The relationship can be explained by sociology, which states that behavior is the basic unit of this relationship. The behavior of the members of the intervening force, whatever their rank, will be essential to the outcome of the relationship and hence, of the operation. It can be characterized as a primary mean of influence and credibility.

FM 3.0 states “Army forces are trained, equipped, and organized to control land, populations, and situations for extended periods...Civil considerations are especially critical in stability operations...Stability operations...place great demands on small units.”³⁷ The intervening force and the local population cannot avoid each other. When a force is implementing a stability and support mission, regardless of the situation, interactions will take place with the local population. A force involved in Stability and Support Operations must control the terrain and even seek out the local inhabitants in order to maintain, keep and enforce peace. As a result, the force will be spread across the country where it will not be able to avoid at the very least being seen by the population. Even if a force tries to avoid direct contact with the population, its members will be seen and their behavior interpreted.³⁸

Through its behavior, the force must control the nature of this relationship in order to set the proper tone and ensure that it is well perceived. Failing to recognize the importance of the unit's behavior on the nature of the relationship would be tantamount to ignoring the primary means of

³⁶George A. Theodorson, and Achilles G. Theodorson, *A Modern Dictionary of Sociology*, (New York: Thomas Y Cromwell Company, 1969), 28.

³⁷US Army, *FM 3-0, Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2001), 9-1 & 9-5.

³⁸George A. Theodorson, and Achilles G. Theodorson, *A Modern Dictionary of Sociology*, (New York: Thomas Y Cromwell Company, 1969), 27. Behavior is a “term that applies to anything an individual does, says, thinks or feels...”

influence over the local population. The following chart depicts the relationship between interaction and influence.³⁹




Figure 2 The relationship between influence and interactions.

The more interactions the force creates the more influence it will have on the population. The force's behavior will influence the population by the way of example, deterrence and persuasion combined.

Example

Setting the example in both words and deeds accomplishes two major tasks for the force. First, it removes the possibility of criticism by ensuring that soldiers on the ground are doing the "right thing" and that their action are acceptable within the norms of the sponsoring nations as well as those of the local population. The second task it accomplishes is to foster a positive perception of the intervening force. Actions by the force should nourish a feeling of esteem and respect among and between the intervening force and the population. Both these conditions are prerequisites for deterring and persuading the belligerents or groups belonging to the population to act within acceptable limits. Without the adoption of an exemplary behavior, the force neither earns respect of the population nor sets the conditions for long-term success.

Deterrence

Exemplary behavior contributes to deterrence. It reassures the population and establishes the notion that the intervening force is cognizant of the population's basic social, legal and political rights. Deterrence is necessary for force protection as well as for enforcing peace, security and

³⁹Abraham ZALEZNIK and David MOMENT, *The Dynamics Of Interpersonal Behavior*, (New

stability. However, the more threatening, hence deterrent, the behavior of the force is, the more animosity it might raise within the population. The ability to deter therefore must be balanced with the need to achieve the maintenance of a positive perception within the population while threatening those elements that might work against the objectives established for the mission. Having the esteem and the respect of the population is the measure that defines the appropriate balance.

Persuasion

Persuasion works to bring the adversary or neutral part of the population toward a position that supports the mission. Persuasion works mainly because of a coherence between words and deeds reinforced by the concepts of example and deterrence. Coherence between words and deeds is essential to the credibility of the force fulfilling the mission. For example, during operation Restore Hope in Somalia, a humanitarian operation which purpose was to help the starving population, the landing of U.S. forces under the lights of the cameras at the time of great audience in the United States or a French official taking a bag of rice on his shoulder while being surrounded by journalists will be perceived as insulting. The Somali witnesses will wonder, as the old man from the quote at the beginning of the monograph meant: is the real purpose of the mission helping the Somali population or fostering the western good conscience,⁴⁰ One cannot say he comes to help his human brother while giving him help under the visible scope of the media instead of offering it. In this situation, the words are good. The deed, here help given under the microscope of the media, can be seen as contemptuous instead of sincere.⁴⁰ Another contradiction is evident when the force attempts to reinforce the notion of a secure environment while staying on a war footing. In other words, the force sallies forth from its fortified position in full combat gear, yet tells the surrounding population that it is safe to move about their business. The result of such a contradiction might well be distrust and then animosity, hence an inability to persuade.

York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967), 72.

⁴⁰See page 1 quotation of General Roques. Edited by Louis Balmond, *Les interventions militaires françaises en Afrique* (French Military Intervention In Africa) (Paris: Editions A. Pédone, 1998), 140-141.

Example, deterrence and persuasion are necessary tools in influencing the population and have to be combined and balanced to gain the population's support of the mission. Furthermore, they have a long term and strategic effect through their impact on the credibility of the force. The behavior of the members of the force will shape the perception of both the country providing the force and its deployed armed forces. The easiest example to give is the now common but essentially false perception that the United States and its armed forces are so risk adverse that an opponent perceives that U.S. force as weak and unwilling to face confrontation. Hence, it creates the opportunity for miscalculation and leads to true confrontation because of the lack of deterrent effect.⁴¹

Unfortunately, credibility is a quality that can easily be destroyed but takes a long time to build. Credibility can be destroyed several ways. It can grow from discrepancies between words and deeds as stated above. The main result of those discrepancies is distrust, which will diminish support of the local population and erode faith in the force. Credibility can also be lost by the way of amoral or contemptuous behavior on behalf of the members of the force.⁴² This domain is more difficult to assess because amoral behavior on behalf of western forces' soldiers does not currently happen often and as such is difficult to analyze and theorize. Furthermore, any assessment is complicated by the fact that it must take into account the morality and values of the local population and not of the force. The loss of credibility in this case is also highly dependant on the media and on perception by the local population of the verdict of the tribunal judging the guilty soldier. If the justice works efficiently and the media reports to the local population the punishment received by any soldier guilty of a criminal act, then the negative effect of the misconduct on the local population will be mitigated.

The state of mind of the local population and its adversarial parties opposed to the

⁴¹See the impact of casualty aversion's perception on deterrence in Charles K. Hyde, "Casualty Aversion", *Aerospace Power journal*, Summer 2000.

⁴²Bruno Demesy, *Etudes prospectives sur la délinquance des troupes françaises*, « Prospective Studies on French Troops Delinquency » (Mémoire de Géopolitique ; Paris: Université Panthéon-Assas Paris II, Avril 2001), 20-27.

intervention has great importance. It can easily undermine credibility through interpretations and even information warfare techniques using either the lack of contact between the force and the local population or exaggerating reports on incidents involving both actors. A lack of interaction between the force and the local population will be interpreted as contemptuous or weak on behalf of the force and cede the freedom of influence among the population to an opponent.

Once credibility is undermined, two observations can be made. Credibility takes time to establish and once discredit is established in the relationship, it has a tendency to work as a reinforcing dynamic on the mindset of the local population. It will reinforce negative perception toward the force and any questionable behavior by the force will have much more negative than positive influence.

It appears that the behavior of the force through its influence and credibility will have an essential part in the outcome of a Stability and Support Operation. When a force undertakes to establish a viable relationship with the local population, its behavior is at the heart of the issue.

However, precisely controlling the behavior of one's own soldier is not an easy task. In fact, behavior presents a dilemma that can be summarized the following way: the more interactions, the more risk of negative behavior that might undermine the efforts of the force, and the less interactions the less influence on the population's perception, so on the relationship and so on the outcome of the operation.

In conclusion, it appears that the local population is the essential factor for the success of Stability and Support Operations, at least as much as the enemy forces are in offensive and defensive operations. Concepts exist that can help to influence this relationship. However, influence is totally dependant on the relationship that the intervening force establishes with a specific population at a specific place and time. The behavior of the members of the intervening force is one of the pillars of this relationship. This observation should have shown the western armies the necessity to understand the phenomenon. Unfortunately, from the author's research, it

seems that in many cases the need to understand and strengthen the relationship between the intervening force and the local population has not been fully addressed.

V. THE LACK OF A COMPREHENSIVE DOCTRINE IN THE U.S. AND FRENCH ARMIES.

In dealing with the relationship between their forces and the local population, both the U.S. and French Armies lack explicit doctrine or specified directives addressing how to interact with and develop a positive relationship with the local population. Surprisingly, they use very different approaches to cope with the issue and arrive at the same result: neither army fully exploits the potential that lies in the direct contact between the soldiers and the local individuals, and at a higher level between the intervening force and the population.

In fact, both armies have failed to address the topic in depth in their doctrine. Yet, the doctrine of both countries, “FM 3-0, Operations” and “TTA 901, Forces terrestres en opérations”, in English, Ground Forces In Operations, identifies the importance of the local population in Stability and Support Operations.⁴³ Since both armies acknowledge that the relationship with the local population is the key to success, then, for both armies, it should become the driving influence for all efforts the force undertakes. In other words, the relationship should shape the operation. In reality, this is not the case and the main consequence of this shortcoming is a significant loss of control over the relationship and hence the intervening force’s freedom of action.

There is no general doctrinal study about the relationship between the intervening force and the population at the operational level in either army.⁴⁴ Furthermore, there are only a few paragraphs scattered throughout each doctrine dealing with the relationship, primarily at the tactical level of interaction, between soldiers and individuals belonging to the population. Most discussions regarding the relationship between the local population and the intervening force focus mainly on the population as a factor to be considered rather than on its relationship with the

⁴³US Army. *FM 3-0, Operations*, (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 2001), 9-15.
Ministère de la Défense, Armée de Terre. *TTA 901, Forces terrestres en opérations* (Ground Forces In Operations), (Paris : Etat-Major de l’Armée de Terre, 1999), paragraph 2.1.1.2.

⁴⁴See Appendix II.

force and how it must structured and cultivated.⁴⁵ Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) have been developed in both armies to create soldiers' handbooks for specific operations, but they are not replacements for doctrine.

If there is no doctrine, then the benefits a doctrine provides, such as, shared understanding, unity of thought, commonality of training, unity of action, and coherence in operations will never be realized. Doctrine provides units and soldiers a shared and common understanding of the “whys” and “hows” of a country’s method of waging war and conducting operations. It also provides the framework within which soldiers and leaders can approach and solve operational problems. Once again, the common framework established by a well-understood doctrine provides the wherewithal for unity of thought, and hence the ability to adapt to the environment in ways that can ensure unity of purpose over time. Doctrine also establishes the baseline for a commonality of training that reinforces the coherence of tactical operation by ensuring that units working toward a common purpose have an integrated and complementary approach to assessing and executing workable solutions.⁴⁶

In transitioning between the primary mission of most armies which is to close with and destroy an enemy, leaders and institutions must recognize that the “warrior mindset” inculcated in the force is not always compatible with missions assigned in Stability and Support Operations. The shift in “mindset” or the adaptation of the conventional warrior ethos to cope with the difference in requirements between conventional combat operations is one of, if not the most important factors in setting the conditions for a positive relationship between the population and

⁴⁵Even the US Army “FM 41-10, Civil Military Operations” refers only tangentially to this issue.

⁴⁶Disparities from one unit to another within rotation and between rotations might be the rule. Orders understanding and enforcement, reaction to external constraints and pressure will all be different with sometimes-dramatic results. The case of 3rd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division in Kosovo in January 2000 is, unfortunately, an example of how the lack of understanding of a situation may have contributed to misconduct during the operation. At the same time, other Battalions in the same Brigade, with the same time allocated to the preparation for the operation adapted quickly to the actual situation and were able to accomplish the mission and avoid misconduct on behalf of their soldiers. See Joe Burtas, Report finds incidents of misconduct toward Kosovars, Public Affairs (September 29, 2000), available at <http://www.usma.army.mil/PublicAffairs/000929/Kosovars.htm> (January 17, 2002). The battalion was at the origin of diverse incidents related to the issue of behavior

the intervening force. The “warrior mindset” clearly flows from a doctrine focused on defeat of an enemy. Currently, there is no doctrine from which to identify and shape a mindset effective at influencing a population. Thus, if existing doctrine fails to adequately identify the differences between high intensity conflict and Stability and Support Operations in terms of the force’s relation to the enemy vice the population, commanders will have a difficult time identifying when a shift in “mindset” is necessary. Furthermore, they will not be able to determine what the new “mindset” should be because of the lack of a comprehensive doctrine dealing with the relationship between an intervening force and the local population.

Both armies are dependent on tradition, culture, political pressure or ill-adapted doctrine to determine their attitude toward the local population. In his doctorate thesis Thierry Paulmier,⁴⁷ - quoting Pierre Dabiezies⁴⁸ - compares peace keeping operations to two historical kinds of operations: Pacification operations, embodied by the conquest of the French Empire by Gallieni and Lyautey⁴⁹ and Guerilla Wars, embodied by the wars in Indochina and Algeria. According to this thesis, they define current French intervention culture. As for the U.S. Army, Joseph Babb

toward the local population: rape and murder of a little girl, questioning a suspect while threatening him with a weapon.

⁴⁷Thierry Paulmier, *L’armée française et les opérations de maintien de la paix*, (Paris, Université Panthéon Assas Paris II, 1997), 25.

⁴⁸Pierre Dabiezies is a former Colonel of the French “Troupes de Marine” (Indochina and Algerian war), former French ambassador in Gabon (1982-1986), former president of the Fondation pour les études de Défense Nationale (Foundation for National Defense Studies) and Professor of the Sorbonne University Paris I. Translated from <http://www.africaintelligence.fr/ps/FR/Arch/LC-/LC- 308.asp> (April 17, 2002).

⁴⁹Maréchal Gallieni is considered by the French with Bugeaud and Lyautey as one of the great thinker and actor of the French Colonial Empire Conquest. He served in Africa and in the French Caribbean and Indian Ocean Islands. In 1892, he was assigned to Indochina to pacify the Northern part of the country along the Chinese border. Having achieved this task, he became governor of Madagascar where once again he achieved the pacification of the country. In 1914, as Paris military governor, he took an important part to the Battle of The Marne by organizing and deploying the Maunoury Army on the German right flank. See Roger-Francis Didelot, *Gallieni, soldat de France*, (Gallieni, Soldier Of France), (Paris, Editions Paul Dupont, 1947). Douglas Porch, *Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lyautey : The Development Of French Colonial Warfare* in Paret, Peter, ed. *Makers Of Modern Strategy From Machiavelli To The Nuclear Age*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986), 376.

Maréchal Lyautey did follow the path of Gallieni in Indochina and Madagascar. Appointed in Morocco from 1903 on, he became governor of Morocco until 1925 where he enforces with more or less success Gallieni’s and his own theories and concepts. See Guillaume de Tarde, *Lyautey, le chef en action*, (Lyautey, the commander at work), (Paris, Gallimard, 1959). Douglas Porch, *Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lyautey : The Development Of french Colonial Warfare* in Paret, Peter, ed. *Makers Of Modern Strategy From Machiavelli To The Nuclear Age*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986), 376.

and Lieutenant-colonel Ferdinand Irizarry believe that the U.S. military's mindset focused on the decisive use of force against an identified and tangible enemy and, to a lesser degree, the question of risk aversion in Stability and Support Operations, are the base from which the U.S. Army approaches the issue of establishing a relationship with the local population.⁵⁰

However, even though there is a lack of doctrine, patterns of behavior and models of relationship exist in both armies and have been adopted to fill the void. Chapter 2 of "FM 22-100, Army Leadership" explains that the values of all U.S. soldiers are imbedded in the U.S. Army culture and hence in its operations. This assertion demonstrates that a shared value set resulting from a common education and doctrine on leadership provides shared guidelines on how soldiers are expected to behave. Those guidelines produce patterns of behavior that influence the relationship between an intervening force and the local population. Yet, when combined with the aforementioned environmental constraints such as political and legal constraints, those guidelines do not substitute for a comprehensive doctrine. Because of the lack of doctrine, commanders will respond to constraints following their own assessment of the situation,⁵¹ that may or may not be congruent with those of their superiors and contemporaries based on each individual's experience and training. In other words, each commander is left to craft his own unique solution that may or may not support unity of action and purpose.

The lack of doctrine will result in a lack of thorough understanding of the relationship between the force and the population. A direct effect of this is that one is unable to control a phenomenon he does not understand clearly and thoroughly. Furthermore, if one loses the ability to control then his actions will be shaped by the events rather than his action shaping the events. At that point, freedom of action is lost. When a commander does not clearly understand the essential means, i.e. the relationship with the population, to achieve success in Stability and

⁵⁰ Joseph Babb is a USA CGSC instructor, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and LTC Irizarry is Chief CA/CMO Training and Doctrine Division, USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, interviewed by the author, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 17 January 2002.

⁵¹ Walter E. Kretchik, Robert F. Baumann and John T. Fishel, *Invasion, Intervention, "Intervasion": A Concise History Of The US Army In Operation Uphold Democracy*, (Fort Leavenworth,

Support Operations, he cannot influence the decision process that establishes the environmental constraints. Furthermore, having no concept or doctrine at hand, he has no conceptual and theoretical basis to argue the necessity of a good relationship with the population and to identify how the constraints might undermine the development of a good relationship. Thus, those constraints will still shape the relationship according to the logic of their needs, e.g. political and legal, instead of being shaped by the needs of the relationship. Once the commander has lost the ability to influence the constraints imposed by his superiors, he cedes the freedom of action and hence the ability to control how the relationship between force and population develops. Furthermore, these difficulties are amplified when the force is involved in a multinational operation where, to the process specific to each country, is added the necessity to compromise on the constraints. In Stability and Support Operations, the loss of freedom of action, in terms of controlling the relationship between the force and the population finds its expression toward superior and subordinate echelons in both space and time.

The lack of understanding of the relationship between the force and the local population will influence the relationship between the commander and his subordinates. The commander may lose the freedom of action necessary to influence his soldiers' morale. Rules of engagement can deny a commander the freedom to act to put an end to an obvious offense to the basic values that legitimate the operation.⁵² The inability to act in such situation can have a corrosive effect on soldiers' moral when they see that the chain of command is unable or, in their eyes, unwilling to prevent a morally offensive act. Without proper explanations or training resulting from a shared understanding, the subordinates will develop their own perception of the situation. Moreover,

Kansas, US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1998), 129-146. During this operation difference in behaviors, e.g. force protection level and contact with the local population were common.

⁵²See Commandant Franchet, *Casque bleu pour rien, ce que j'ai vraiment vu en Bosnie* (Blue Helmet For Nothing, What I Really Saw In Bosnia), (Paris: Editions JC Lattes, 1995), 122. The Commandant Franchet explains how French Blue Helmets in West Bosnia were forced to leave Muslims refugees at the mercy of the Serbs controlling the area by their chain of command because intervening in this case was not part of their mission and they had not receive any order to do so.

those perceptions may differ widely.⁵³ As a result, subordinates can easily become confused and develop a sense of helplessness and powerlessness in controlling the situation around them.

Furthermore, the loss of freedom of action and the necessity for subordinate commanders to develop their understanding of the situation in the absence of a coherent doctrine, influences the conduct of operations in space and time. In other words, the lack of doctrine, i. e., a common approach to problem solving and a shared understanding of how to execute this kind of military operations, may lead to a loss of the ability to influence the relationship between the force and the population. In space, it is manifest by the lack of coherence in operations between units. In time, it is manifest by the lack of continuity of action within the force from rotation to rotation. Without a common framework for operations, different units are likely to use different approaches to establishing and maintaining a relationship with the population while executing their mission, even if given the same general guidance by their superiors. One unit can be very inflexible in its approach and centralize decision-making and initiative, thereby reducing opportunities for contact and influence among the population by the force as a whole. While another unit can exhibit an overly flexible approach that allows its subordinate to develop yet another series of approaches to solutions that vary widely from area to area. As a result, adjacent units without a common doctrine and “mindset” that operate within the same area may have vastly differing behaviors in identical situation thus challenging the consistency of the operation in the eyes of the population, thereby reducing the commander’s ability to influence the relationship hence reducing his freedom of action.⁵⁴

⁵³For the US Army, an example taken from Laura L. Miller and Charles Moskos’ article: “Humanitarians Or Warriors? Race, Gender, And Combat Status In Operation Restore Hope,” depicts the creation of two groups among the US soldiers in Somalia opposed in their perception of the Somali population. The opposition went so far as to create friction within the unit, thus undermining the moral. For the French Army, Thierry Paulmier quotes a French Captain in Sarajevo observing that company commanders do not receive any special education in interacting with the local population. Thus, he implies that he has to find his own way of coping with the issue, which is hard within a four to six month rotation and, so, will automatically lead to a decreased efficiency. . Laura L. Miller and Charles Moskos, Humanitarians or warriors?: Race, Gender, And Combat Status In operation restore Hope. Thierry Paulmier, *L’Armée Française Et Les Opérations De Maintien De La Paix* (42).

⁵⁴Walter E. Kretchik, Robert F. Baumann and John T. Fishel, *Invasion, Intervention, “Intervasion”: A Concise History Of The US Army In Operation Uphold Democracy*, (Fort Leavenworth,

The loss of freedom of action in time encompasses the entire rotation system. Generally, units prepare for stability and support missions by training just before deployment. Once deployed, a unit has to take into account the legacy and vision of the preceding unit. It must attempt to avoid spreading discontent within a local population that has already developed habits and expectations, based on the previous unit's actions, by changing them abruptly. Over a rotation of six months, a unit has barely the time to assess the evolution of the situation and adapt its attitude toward the local population. As a result, a unit barely has the freedom to adapt to its attitude. In other words, a unit is often biased upon arriving in the theater of operation, then constrained during the mission, then redeployed before it can fully implement another strategy to develop its relationship with the local population. Then, the following dynamic can easily prevail. The first units arriving in the area of operation set the tone for the following ones. If their method seems to work, the follow-on unit often fails to reassess the situation. It simply follows the path of its predecessor because there is no doctrine upon which to base an assessment. Rotation after rotation, the same methods may be applied with slight evolution and without a clear and continuous assessment of their efficiency.

In summary, on the spectrum of flexibility, the lack of doctrine facilitates the shift of the cursor to either near inflexibility or near anarchy. If the cursor is in one of these two areas, it will result in inadequacy and incoherence in the behavior of the intervening force. In both cases, the force might lose control of the interaction with the local population and the freedom of action that could have helped solve the problem. Fortunately, there are boundaries, e.g. shared education, that tend to limit those effects. However, these boundaries are dependent on the training, experience and "mindset" of the intervening force and, as such, are not sufficient to solve the issue.

VI. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. ARMY METHOD OF OPERATION.

It is the author's conclusion that the U.S. Army tends to build a limited and structured relationship with the local population in which the will to influence has an increasing importance but, it seems, has yet to become the driving factor in the operational design. As a result, there will be fewer interactions, which will lead to the loss of opportunities for contact, and can even create a negative perception of the U.S. forces in some situations.

Limited And Structured Relationship.

The relationship can be characterized as limited because informal interactions at the lowest echelons have been generally denied to the U.S. soldier. For instance, even in a fairly secure environment, soldiers conducting patrols have to apply their wartime skills, e.g. combat patrol techniques are used in non-combat situations, thus cutting themselves off from the civilians surrounding them. The description given by Lieutenant Colonel Richard R. Caniglia in his article, "U.S. and British Approaches to Force Protection" clearly demonstrates that force protection concerns cuts off soldiers "from the people they came to protect."⁵⁵ In this case, the soldiers are denied interactions with the local population, while their leaders are responsible for making contact but only with some of the local leaders. The force may be cut off from the average civilian.

However, because the importance of the relationship is understood and the lack of interactions has been identified, the U.S. Army attempts to enhance relationship with the local population by structuring it. A method of operation has been developed that is organized hierarchically and by function. Hierarchically, when each level of command is generally assigned a corresponding level of civilian leader in the area of operation. By function, when specific units are trained and task to deal particularly with the local population. For example, the lack of

⁵⁵Richard R. Caniglia, US and British Approaches to Force Protection, *Military Review* 4, July-august 2001, 73.

interaction is mitigated by the work of the members of the Civil Affairs (CA) career field. They are essentially responsible for projects in the areas of infrastructure, administration, and social help. However, Civil Affairs teams are limited in number, move around in the greater area of operation and deal primarily with temporary projects. Their interactions are not permanent and are generally limited to community leaders, even if, the project can be shown to benefit the whole population. To mitigate this defect, Special Operation Forces also play a key role in enhancing the relationship. Teams station themselves in villages, towns or sectors of cities in small groups of around ten men in order to establish permanent contact with the local population, gather intelligence and enforce security when needed. Executed in Haiti,⁵⁶ this system is also at work in Bosnia and Kosovo and has generated good results.⁵⁷ Thus, it seems that the U.S. Army method of operation is appropriately balanced between the necessity to interact with the local population and the desire to limit the risks associated with those interactions.

However, it seems that the method came about through evolution rather than design. It is the author's contention that it is the indirect result of the U.S. Army's morale support policy and the direct consequence of the mindset of the U.S. officers and of the self-imposed myth of risk aversion. Indirectly, the fact that the U.S. soldier's quality of life is different from that of the population, particularly in terms of health and sanitation, led the chain of command to take measures to maintain a very high standard of life for its soldiers in operations. Because of these high expectations as to the quality of life and the fact that the chain of command largely meet these expectations by the construction of base camps with all the comfort of home; the U.S.

⁵⁶Walter E. Kretchik, Robert F. Baumann and John T. Fishel, *Invasion, Intervention, "Intervasion": A Concise History Of The US Army In Operation Uphold Democracy*, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1998), 146.

⁵⁷Colonel Heinemann, Dean of Academic of the Command and General Staff College, interviewed by author, Fort Leavenworth, 19 December 2001. Edward J. Amato, "Street Smarts: Unconventional Warriors in Contemporary Joint Urban Operations"(Master's Thesis, Monterey CA Naval Postgraduate School, 2001), 54-63.

soldier often lacks the necessary motivation and opportunity to interact with the local population.⁵⁸

The method is also the direct consequence of the mindset of U.S. officers because the Army's leaders are primarily trained and educated for major combat engagement, and focus on the design and execution of decisive quick operations.⁵⁹ American doctrine emphasizes the concept of quick decisive victory and as a result, most American combat leaders wish to accomplish the mission and have the intervening force returning home as quickly as possible.⁶⁰

The third reason is the idea of risk aversion that no rational facts tend to support.⁶¹ As discussed in chapter two, the primary factor leading the U.S. public opinion to support a withdrawal from Somalia was its perception that the Somalis did not want a U.S. presence anymore and not the number of casualties taken during the operation of Task Force Ranger in Mogadishu on 3-4 October 1993.

As a result of, the expectations as to quality of life when deployed, the notion that the U.S. should avoid long term commitment and entanglement inherent in Stability and Support Operations and the myth that U.S. forces are "risk averse" all combine to provide an explanation as to why there is little inclination and opportunity for the U.S. soldier to interact with the local population. To summarize, the apparent balance between structured contacts and limited

⁵⁸Harriet E. Rice, Recreation Downrange: Army MWR Delivers, *Parks & Recreation* 33, December 1998. US Army, *FM 12-6, Personnel Doctrine*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1994), 7-1.

⁵⁹Walter E. Kretchik, Robert F. Baumann and John T. Fishel, *Invasion, Intervention, "Intervasion": A Concise History Of The US Army In Operation Uphold Democracy*, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1998), 129. Richard R. Caniglia, US and British Approaches to Force Protection, *Military Review* 4, July-august 2001, 73.

⁶⁰It is the author's contention that experience also reinforces this "mindset" when one takes in consideration four of the major involvements of the U.S. Army in the past forty years. The brilliant victory of the Gulf War was by any measure a quick decisive victory that had all the characteristics of a conventional war. Something the U.S. Army has built its doctrine around the end of the Vietnam War. The involvement in Vietnam, Lebanon and Somalia where positive relationships with the local population and a long presence were necessary, as in the current concept of Stability and Support Operations, all ended in setbacks.

⁶¹Charles K Hyde, Casualty Aversion, *Aerospace Power Journal* 14, Summer 2000, 17-27. Richard R. Caniglia, US and British Approaches to Force Protection, *Military Review* 4, July-august 2001, 73.

interactions is not by design, but rather a result of the aforementioned constraints and the adaptation by soldiers and units.⁶²

Lost Opportunities.

The degree of the influence the U.S. forces exert on the local population is restricted because of the limited nature of its contacts with the local population. A limitation in interactions automatically leads to a limitation in influence or more precisely in the number of individuals influenced within the local population. Opportunities to make a difference and set the tone of the relationship will be lost. There are three types of lost opportunities: loss of leverage; loss of opportunities to establish communication; and loss of an opportunity to create a positive relationship of dependence.

It has been stated previously that Special Operation Forces' teams are the units that have been primarily responsible for direct and continuous interactions with the local population, while most other members of the U.S. Forces tend to interact at the level of local leaders. Fortunately, the current Stability and Support Operations in Kosovo has shown a new trend with more involvement of regular units in direct interactions with the local population.⁶³ However, because of the lack of doctrine this trend remains commander dependent. If this trend does not continue then the obvious conclusion from the fact that the soldiers of regular forces will be limited in their direct interaction with local inhabitants is that, the civilian leaders within the population will tend to retain the freedom of action within power and hence leverage and control over the population. As a result, the missed opportunity for the intervening force lies in the inability to leverage an element of power, the local inhabitant that can in turn be used by an adversary seeking to undermine the legitimacy of the mission by instigating discontent among local population against the force.

⁶²Walter E. Kretchik, Force Protection Disparities, *Military Review* 4, July-august 1997, 73.

⁶³Colonel Miller, Seminar Leader at the School of Advanced military studies, Command and General Staff College, interviewed by author, Fort Leavenworth, 11 April 2002.

Beyond the loss of leverage, there are also lost opportunities to establish communication. This communication is essential not only to influence the local population but also to gain its support. Daily interactions are the best way to communicate ideas because they create a coherence of words and deeds and as such foster credibility and sympathy. The limitation of communication also leads to a loss of situational awareness and understanding by cutting the force off from the main source of intelligence in a theater of operation.⁶⁴

Finally, daily interactions are also the best way to create a relationship of dependence when focused on trading with small business owners. They provide support to the rebuilding process of the economic tissue of the society through trade. According to the adherents of the doctrine of economic determinism, social behaviors are explained by economic factors.⁶⁵ Therefore, if one wants to influence the behavior of a population, then using economy as a point of leverage is an approach that should not go unused. If the economic leverage is properly used, it will foster long-term stability within the local area. However, the issue is not limited to lost opportunities, limitation of interactions not only limits influence, it can foster negative perception on behalf of the local population.

Risk Of Fostering Negative Perception.

In fact, limitations in interactions do not correspond to limitation of a perception. Avoiding contact does not mean avoiding perception. The behavior that comprises avoiding contact with the local population leads more often to a negative perception than to a positive one.⁶⁶

In the initial stage of an operation or in unstable situations, the U.S. soldier's behavior of maintaining a "war footing" and avoiding informal interactions can foster a positive perception among the population.⁶⁷ Problems begin to appear when the situation becomes more stable. In

⁶⁴Walter E. Kretchik, Robert F. Baumann and John T. Fishel, *Invasion, Intervention, "Intervasion": A Concise History Of The US Army In Operation Uphold Democracy*, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1998), 141.

⁶⁵George A.Theodorson and Achilles G. Theodorson, *A Modern Dictionary of Sociology*, (New York: Thomas Y Cromwell Company, 1969), 126.

⁶⁶See Appendix III. The fact that withholding provokes distrust has already been theorized.

⁶⁷Pappal, Major, Student at the School of Advanced Military Studies, Command and General Staff College, interviewed by the author at Fort Leavenworth, 31 January 2002.

that case, obvious inconsistencies in behavior harm credibility. The first contradiction flows from the necessity to synchronize words and deeds. In a situation where a force intends to ensure a local population that its purpose is to provide security (peace operations) and/or to provide aid (humanitarian operations), it is necessary to behave as if the security provided is real. The population views the level of force protection assumed by the force as an indication of the general security of the environment. Thus, the force protection policy directly impacts on the perception of the local population vis-à-vis their own security but also impacts the ability of the members of the force to communicate with local civilians. So, any situation where soldiers try to convince the population that the environment is safe should see soldiers without Kevlar helmet and vest and not in complete personal protective equipment. In other words, if the force anticipates trouble or wants to send a message of preparedness for combat, it deploys on a “war footing” but if it wants to reinforce the perception of calm environment it deploys without the complete protective equipment.

The second contradiction lies in disparities between different U.S. forces on the ground in the same area of operation. Civil Affairs, Special Operation Forces and regular units work in a common area but with different missions. Sometimes different commanders adopt different behaviors toward the local population. The local population cannot help but notice those disparities and might well feel some confusion as to why they exist. At the minimum, it will lose any predictable expectation of the U.S. forces behavior and feel uneasy about it.⁶⁸

From these two contradictions, an attack on credibility can result. U.S. soldiers in complete personal protective equipment in a relatively safe environment suggest they are not willing to take any risk. The consequences of sending unclear signals are best embodied by the myth of risk aversion that might have led many adversaries to think they could confront the U.S. Army if they were able to inflict sufficient casualties. Furthermore, any voluntary limitation between

⁶⁸Walter E. Kretchik, Force Protection Disparities, *Military Review* 4, July-August 1997, 73. Being not predictable is a positive thing when dealing with an enemy but not when dealing with civilians.

individuals' interactions is seldom perceived as a sign of positive intentions but more often as a sign of contempt or fear.⁶⁹ The question is not whether this feeling is right or wrong, but the fact that it can be perceived as such is what matters.⁷⁰ This perception for instance leads to the nickname "Ninja turtle" given to U.S. soldiers in Bosnia.⁷¹

In summary, the U.S. Army approach to its relationship with the local population seems to be influenced by constraints external to the issue such as warrior mindset and force protection. These factors cause U.S. forces to be less willing to take risks in Stability and Support Operations. Therefore, fewer interactions with the population occur. Leverage is then lost and a negative perception is fostered in the majority of the local population. Because the deficiencies of this system have been understood, positive stopgap measures have been taken, for example the expansion and inclusion of Civil Affairs, the involvement of the Special Operation Forces and more recently the increased contact by regular units in Kosovo. Those remedies demonstrate that this issue has been identified but they do not address the heart of the problem: the relationship between the force and the population that is the center of gravity of an operation must have a logic of its own and drive the operation.

The French have a totally different approach and display other weaknesses in this domain with similar results. In fact, the French Army approach to its relationship with the local population is based on the search for integration in order to increase influence but at the price of higher risks.

⁶⁹See Appendix III.

⁷⁰Walter E. Kretchik, Force Protection Disparities, *Military Review* 4, July-august 1997, 73.

⁷¹Richard R. Caniglia, US and British Approaches to Force Protection, *Military Review* 4, July-august 2001, 73.

VII. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE FRENCH ARMY METHOD OF OPERATION.

It is the author conclusion that the French Army seeks integration of the forces into the area of operation's social tissue. This integration process consists of the multiplication of interactions both in time and space, combined with initiative delegated to the lower levels. The roots of this approach can be found mainly in compliance with tradition and culture and to a lesser degree with external constraints. While the will to influence the local population seems to be the driving factor in the French approach, a lack of a comprehensive understanding of the dynamic resulting from the lack of a thorough thought process increases the amount of risk.

Search For Integration.

The search for integration drives units to establish contact with the local population at all levels to create multiple types of interactions. The interactions have to be based on a respect for the local population's culture.⁷² As a result, initiative has to be delegated to the lowest echelon, to include, within some bounds, decisions on the level of force protection.⁷³

As with the U.S. Army, the need for a method of operation is understood and the French Army follows the same guidelines: leader-to-leader interactions, Civil Affairs and Special Operation Forces' missions. "TTA 901, Forces terrestres en opérations", in English, Ground Forces In Operations, the French equivalent of FM 3-0; states that Civil Military Operations (CMO, Affaires Civilo-militaires in French) encompass all actions undertaken by forces involved on a theater of operation that take into account interactions between the forces and the civil environment.⁷⁴ Accordingly, "La gestion de l'environnement psychologique en opérations," in

⁷²Thierry Paulmier, *L'armée française et les opérations de maintien de la paix* (The French Army And Peacekeeping Operations), (Paris, Université Panthéon Assas Paris II, 1997), 108.

⁷³Ibid, 47.

⁷⁴Ministère De La Défense, Armée de Terre, *TTA 901, Forces terrestres en opérations* (Ground Forces Operations), (Paris : Etat-Major de l'Armée de Terre, juin 1999), paragraph 642.

English, *Managing The Psychological Environment In Operation*, describes the organization of the action taken to foster the understanding of the relationship with the local population.⁷⁵

The French method of operations is the result of the French experience and tradition of colonization.⁷⁶ As a result, the French method is less constrained by external pressures because the culture and traditions deriving from this experience have become de facto norms of operation. Since the end of the Algerian War in 1962, units accustomed to operations abroad have maintained the skills necessary to develop a positive relationship with the local population.⁷⁷ The Army has adapted methods of operation and the mindset of its personnel to the realities of today's requirements.

French experience in colonial operations notes that the more interactions that occur with the population, the more the ability to influence the population changes positively or negatively. The ability to influence the population becomes a function of the number of interactions and their quality over time. At the same time, as the number of interactions increases, the risks to the force and its mission increase. Accordingly, from the French experience, interactions with the population should be managed systematically within a common framework and understanding, i.e., a doctrine. They should be consistent in space and through time and encompass all forms of contact: formal, informal, cultural, economic, political, etc. Should this approach be realized, then a reinforcing dynamic will begin to rebuilt the social fabric of the troubled country.

Increasing Risks.

The increase in the number of interactions creates risks. The significance of these risks varies depending on the situation. Those risks can be divided in three groups: the one applying to the

⁷⁵Ministère De La Défense, Armée de Terre, *La gestion de l'environnement psychologique en opération* (Managing The Psychological Environment In Operation), (Paris : Etat-Major de l'Armée de Terre, 25 mars 2000), chapter 3.

⁷⁶Colonial administration, "Bureaux des Affaires Indigènes", "Office of indigenous Affairs", latter in Algeria the "Section Administrative Spécialisée", "Specialized Administrative Departments", and Military units were all working on enhancing the relationship with the local population applying skills currently used.

⁷⁷Thierry Paulmier, *L'armée française et les opérations de maintien de la paix*, (Paris, Université Panthéon Assas Paris II, 1997), 28.

society made up by the local population, the one applying to the force and one applying to the mission. In Stability and Support Operations, those risks have yet to reach the point of endangering the mission.

The risk applying to the society is well described by Douglas Porch in his article: “French Colonial forces On the Saharan Rim.”⁷⁸ It consists in the destabilization of one culture and society when confronted by another that is stronger economically and better organized. The sudden input of material wealth, change in organization and confrontation with other values can erode the structure of a society to the extent that the result is more instability than stability.

The risk to the force is physical and moral. Multiplication of informal interactions to establish confidence in the relationship does not conform to the concern of force protection in the short term particularly if the situation is unstable. There are, in fact, a number of “risky” situations when one seek a close relationships with the population. Close relationship often requires dispersion among and immersion in the population. The complexity of the local population factors and of Stability and Support Operations themselves makes it an unstable mixture as the hostage crisis in Bosnia during 1995 demonstrated.⁷⁹ However, the fact remains that, ultimately, the security for a force is contingent upon being accepted by the local population. As a former commander of the 5ième Régiment Interarmes D’outre-mer, (Fifth Overseas Combined Regiment), stated it during operations in Somalia in 1992-93: “La sécurité de mes détachements ne peut être assurée que par la population elle-même”, in English the security of my units can only be ensured by the local population itself.⁸⁰ The moral risk lies in the possibility that soldiers

⁷⁸Edited by James C. Bradford, *The Military And Conflict Between Cultures: Soldiers At the Interface*, (Texas, A&M University Press, 1997), 163-182.

⁷⁹In June 1995, in Bosnia, during the United Nation Protection Force (UNPROFOR) mandate, to pressure the countries involved in the force, the Bosnian Serbs took up to 370 observers and blue helmet hostage. The task was rendered easy by the mission of collecting and guarding the Serbian heavy weapons but without removing them from the Serbian Army positions, which lead to posting numbers of small Blue Helmets units in the middle of Serbian forces. Furthermore, the task was facilitated by long term good relationships establish with the Serbian military, which allowed them to catch some Blue Helmet small units off guard.

⁸⁰Thierry Paulmier, *L’armée française et les opérations de maintien de la paix*, (Paris, Université Panthéon Assas Paris II, 1997), 109.

might lose their neutrality because of their relationship with one member or group belonging to the local population.⁸¹ “Going native,” as it is colloquially referred to, can quickly provide a negative impact on the relationship with different factions in the population if the force is seen as taking sides. Its neutrality and professional detachment may be irreparably damaged. For the French Army, the balance between increased influence and risk is weighted in favor of the influence also as long as the focus of operations remains on maintaining the quality of the relationship.

At this point, another risk appears which can endanger the mission. The interactions needed to provide a quality relationship also offer opportunities for the creation of unacceptable risk to the mission. In other words, quality requires contact; contact increases risks. The quality of this relationship is fostered by the multiplication of interactions because of the aforementioned reasons. It is at risk because an increase in the number of interactions means an increase in the opportunities for misconduct and mistakes that are harder to mitigate because of the initiative given to subordinates. The actions of a single unit in the French intervening force can affect the perception of the whole force in the eyes of the local population.⁸² The issue can be summarized in the following manner: the more initiative given to a poor unit the greater the influence the actions of the poor unit will exert on the legitimacy of the mission.

In fact, within the context of the current Stability and Support Operations and due to the short duration of rotations, when the risks described above are realized, they usually do not endanger the mission but undermine the efforts of the force to accomplish the mission in a timely manner. The risks must therefore be taken into account and studied. The force has to be trained to give them full consideration. Hence, the lack of doctrine and the unwillingness to question the culture and habits ingrained in a force results in less vigilance and more risk to the force.

⁸¹Ibid, 109-110.

⁸²Bruno Demesy, *Etudes prospectives sur la délinquance des troupes françaises*, « Prospective Studies on French Troops Delinquency » (Mémoire de Géopolitique, Paris: Université Panthéon-Assas Paris II, Avril 2001), 26.

Consequently, it seems that, in the French approach, the benefits exceed the risks as long as previously stated conditions are established. Naturally, a climate in which interactions are encouraged tends to create sympathy and more openness in communication. A healthy reinforcing circle can then be created from which every subordinate in the field will be able to take advantage and use their initiative. The level of force protection can either be reduced or increased according to the local situation, thus maintaining congruence between words and deeds and developing other means of communication. Furthermore, changing his attitude according to circumstances permits a local commander to send other kinds of messages to the local population.

The quality of the relationship is also enhanced because interactions with the entire local population help undermine the influence of hostile local leaders. Information will then flow in both directions. Furthermore, because of increased interaction, additional micro economic exchanges will occur, and the local population will become increasingly dependant on the force. The interest of a local population, relying for its physical and economic security on the force, will be more convergent with that of the force. The creation of convergent interests is the best way to get two social groups to work together. The result of such a process will be to set the conditions for solving the problems of the society and hence reduce the need for the intervening force's presence.

The French approach to the relationship with the local population is to look for more interactions that are informal. This is the result of tradition and culture. The lack of doctrine explains that in reality this approach has not reached its full potential and presents important risks. The French Army has found solutions to developing relationships with the local population. They are based on tradition and culture. They are not based on a doctrine and a thorough look at the requirement in today's environment.

In conclusion, although the U.S. and French Armies have indicated the importance of the relationship between the intervening force and the local population in their existing doctrine, yet neither has clearly and completely articulated it. The U.S. Army is looking for less risk because

of constraints external to the issue but at the price of fewer interactions at the cost of reduced influence. The French Army is looking for more influence, accepting more risks, but has not engaged itself in having a close look at what the consequences of mere implementation of traditions and culture are. Therefore, both external pressure and the weight of established habits are primary in the establishment of the relationship with the local population. From this flows a loss of freedom of action and mastery of the relationship, resulting in the loss of leverage essential for the success of the mission for both Armies. All those defects could be limited in their consequences by the creation of a relevant and complete doctrine.

VIII. DOCTRINE: THE NEED AND FEASIBILITY.

Now that it has been established that a doctrine is missing, the exact nature of this doctrine must be defined. In order to define it, one must assess and understand the environment that will shape the future doctrine and address to what extent a doctrinal foundation is missing. If the foundational pieces are missing upstream, the validity and applicability of the doctrine will be uncertain when it reaches the force down stream. Finally, the feasibility of creating such a doctrine has to be evaluated.

It appears that it is not so much a doctrinal publication that is missing but rather a body of doctrine. Furthermore, the doctrine is feasible because the relevant material to create a doctrine already exists. However, the environment within which the doctrine will be developed still needs to be shaped. The following sketch illustrates the components necessary in order to create a doctrine.




Figure 3 The road for development of doctrine.⁸³

⁸³The author's model based on interview with Dr Schneider, School of Advanced Military Studies' Faculty, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, February 2002. See also: Temple III, L. Parker, Of Machine Guns, Yellow Brick Roads And Doctrine, *Airpower Journal* 6, Summer 1992, 26-37 and Robert P. Pellegrini, "The Link Between Science And Philosophy And Military Theory: Understanding The Past: Implications For The Future" (Thesis, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, June 1995).

The role of “Need” is to create the dynamic of the doctrine building process. It frames the requirements. “Science” helps to conceptualize the issue at hand and to establish rules applicable to different situations. “Experience” and “History” both prove the reliability of science and are used to synthesize solutions for its shortfalls. An understanding of the “Current Environment” is the point of departure of all analysis necessary in developing a theory of how the world works and a strategy for getting things done. The understanding and synthesis of the five conditions described above allows one to follow two tracks in developing a system that coherently deals with the realities of the world. The first track lies within the domain of art: “the creation of an idea for expression in the real world.”⁸⁴ It is from this domain that a theory or expression of how the world is organized and functions is created. Within this theory, principles are extracted to serve as a basis for doctrine. The other track lies within the domain of action or the application of knowledge to accomplish a specific purpose or attain a designated aim. Within this domain, a strategy is created that specifies how the ends desired might be accomplished with the ways and means at hand. From the strategy, concepts or combinations of ways and means can be generated, which also serve as the basis for doctrine.

Doctrine is then derived from the domain of art and the domain of action with the intent of providing a common understanding about how to identify resource and arrange the tasks necessary, over time, to accomplish a specified mission.

In order to develop a doctrine, all the aforementioned conditions have to be met and the relation between art and action understood. The first question to answer is: does a need exist? The previous chapters assert that, regarding the relationship between an intervening force and the local population, no completed doctrine exists and improvement can be achieved. They also identify that it is of utmost importance to develop this relationship well, because the mission and the credibility of a nation, as well as the safety and the performance of its forces, are at stake.

⁸⁴James J. Schneider, “Operational Art and the Revolution in Warfare” (Ph.D. Unpublished paper, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Ft Leavenworth, KS, 1993).

In current doctrine the local population is still considered as a part of the environment like other actors, e.g. non governmental organizations, media or even terrain; and not as the subject of the operation as the enemy in the classic Offense and Defense operations. Here is the fundamental difference in operational approach that must be addressed. The following sketch adapted from Figure 1.1 FM 3.0 illustrates an important defect in perception.




Figure 4 The way enemy, population and other components of the environment should fit within the scope of military operations according to the U.S. Army doctrine.⁸⁶

LEGEND:

- Area well covered by a doctrine.
- Area covered by the doctrine.
- Area partially covered by the doctrine.
- Degree of importance, priority or even existence within the situation mentioned.

⁸⁵MOOTW: Military Operations Other Than War. MTW: Major Theater of War. SSC: Small Scale Contingencies. PME: Peace Making and Enforcement.

⁸⁶Adapted from FM 3-0 (1-15).

This sketch depicts where the local population should stand in the scope of military operations. The legend shows which areas are, according to the author, adequately covered by doctrine and their importance in particular situations.

The sketch below is adapted from the French equivalent of FM 3.0 and the same defect can be underlined.





Figure 5 The way enemy, population and other component of the environment should fit within the scope of military operations according to the French doctrine.⁸⁷



In both sketches, the author added the part “not covered in doctrine” to the original sketch to show that notions of subject of the operation and environment are missing.

⁸⁷ Adapted from Ministère De La Défense, Armée de Terre. *TTA 901, Forces terrestres en opérations* (Ground Forces In Operation), (paragraph 5.5). For a definition of the terms Violence suppression and Forces coercion see Appendix 1.

FM 3.0 confirms what is depicted in the sketches. It defines Offense and Defensive operations relative to the enemy, Stability operations relative to the United States interests and Support operations relative to the existing civilian authority regardless of the theater of operations.⁸⁸ Current U.S. Army doctrine includes the local population as a factor in the environment. Likewise, the French doctrine does not address the local population as the subject of an operation. Instead, it underlines its importance by including it in the group of possible Vital Centers.⁸⁹

Because the population has to be considered in certain cases as the subject of the operation, it should draw the same attention as the enemy in operations where the enemy is the subject. The civilian population does not fall inside the logic of thought applied to the enemy. It has its own logic. The population belongs essentially to the realm of human sciences and deals with influence. Therefore, missions dealing with the population as the subject of the operation should have its own body of doctrine.

The next issue to address is the feasibility of a doctrine. The previous chapters have shown that Need, Science, History and Experience exist. The mere fact that the U.S. Army is currently developing a Civil-Military Operations doctrine and the French Army refining its Civil Affairs doctrine proves that the need to cope with the issue is recognized.

Science, as stated earlier, exists in the form of sociology, psychology and behavioral studies. If the complexity of the relationship is taken in account, then science of chaos and theory of complexity can and should be added to the former ones. History and experience can be found in both armies' history of colonization or operations overseas. No synthesis, however, of the four basic conditions has yet been made in regard to the relationship between the force and the population. Furthermore, it seems that critical thinking about the implications of those sciences for the military has been largely absent. For example, no models of understanding relationships

⁸⁸US Army, *FM 3-0, Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2001), 1-15.

⁸⁹Ministère De La Défense, Armée de Terre. *TTA 900, Forces terrestres en opérations* (Paris : Etat-Major de l'Armée de Terre, juin 1999) paragraph 31. A Vital Center is the equivalent of a Center of Gravity at the Strategic level in the French doctrine definition.

have been translated into military terms in order to help examine the interactions between the intervening force and the local population.⁹⁰ Given the conditions described above a military theory cannot exist as a coherent and synthetic thought even if elements of theory already exist.⁹¹

If one remains in the domain of art, a flaw in principles will flow from flaws in theory. Because there are significant differences between the nature of a civilian population and the enemy, principles for relationship with the population will not be identical to the principles of war. Thus, the issue is that no credible doctrine can be built as long as theory and principles supporting the understanding of the nature of the relationship between the force and the population are not clearly established.

Like the domain of art,⁹² the domain of action is incomplete. Strategy exists but means to enforce it are still under debate. As stated in previous chapters, the local population in Stability and Support Operations within Military Operations Other Than War should obtain the same status as the enemy as the subject of operation. Therefore, the issue of the relationship between the intervening force and the local population should be considered at the same level as the relationship between armed forces and the enemy in conventional combat. The difference lies in the nature of the relationship.

If one military accepts this statement as true, the armed forces will have to develop the means, the doctrine, the education and the organization for operations having the population as the subject. Because the military has no control of the mission assigned by political leaders, it will not have the best tool to deal with operations where local population is the essential subject unless relevant doctrine and organization are developed.

In summary, the conditions necessary to realize a completely coherent body of doctrine are not yet established, but the material necessary to build it does exist. Therefore, the realization of a body of doctrine is both needed and feasible. Fortunately, the material associated with the

⁹⁰See Appendix III.

⁹¹See Appendix IV.

⁹²See Figure 4, page 47.

existing doctrines of related (Information Operations and Public Affairs) and included domains (Civil Affairs) is substantial enough to establish the broad framework of this body of doctrine.

IX. CONCLUSION

The local population is an essential actor in the context of Stability and Support Operations. From the first victim of conflict, the population assumes the status of Center of Gravity of the operations in Stability and Support Operations within Military Operations Other Than War. The success of the mission will depend on the population's actions, reactions and capabilities as success depend on the enemy in war. It is obvious that understanding the nature of the relationship existing between the intervening force and the local population is of utmost importance. The behavior of the intervening force takes primary importance in the achievement of the mission. Unfortunately, no doctrine has been realized that deals with this issue. This leads to a lack of mastery of the relationship by military forces.

Under heavy external constraints, the U.S. Army applies a method intended to decrease risk but also lessens influence. Under traditional and cultural constraints, the French Army applies a method that fosters influence but incurs greater risks. Both, the U.S. and the French Armies, while using different approaches, are applying methods that have numerous defects and lead to lost opportunities and efficiency. For both armies, a doctrine could help define the issue and should enable solutions to eliminate or reduce those shortfalls. The doctrine is needed. It is feasible, because all the necessary material exists, but not before some extensive work is done. A synthesis of science, history and experience related to the issue has to be created. The strategy for Stability and Support Operations must be clearly stated. Only then, will adapted principles and concepts appear and from them doctrine will evolve.

The remainder of this chapter will focus on the recommendations concerning the creation of a body of doctrine regarding the relationship between an intervening force and the local population. Currently available material allows the study of recommendations about the creation of this body of doctrine. The recommendations will be limited in scope to U.S. Army doctrine. This study will follow three paths. The first will give broad lines of what the doctrine should deal with. The second will propose a way to insert the new body of doctrine into the current "global" body of

doctrine. The third will assess the relevancy of the creation of a multinational doctrine in this domain.

For coherence and simplicity, the creation of such a body of doctrine should follow the current doctrine development process. The doctrine should focus on determining how military operations are affected by relationships with the local population. It should explain the nature of the subject of the operation: the population. It should define the integration process of the functions belonging to or affecting it: Civil Affairs, Information Operations and Public Affairs. Finally, the doctrine should address an education process adapted to this kind of operation.

The name such a body of doctrine should take is Civil Military Operations. Because the current concept of Civil-Military Operations does not encompass all the elements necessary according to this monograph and to avoid confusion, the term Enlarged Civil-Military Operations will be used throughout this conclusion. The advantage of using a term that is already accepted lies in the reduction or elimination of the possibility of being accused of attempt of manipulation or propaganda. It is essential to avoid this trap because it is clear that issues linked with human rights and civilian protection during conflicts will arise during the thought process leading to the creation of the doctrine of Enlarged Civil-Military Operations.

Doctrine will have to focus on explaining the nature of the relationship with the population. The population has little to do with the enemy, as understood by military personnel. So, it must be explained together with the nature of the interactions that will occur from the beginning of the operation. Those explanations will be taken from theory and used as an introduction to the Enlarged Civil Military Operation's new body of doctrine. The sciences addressed earlier in this monograph will therefore be essential. This process will lead to a doctrine that might differ in its shape from the one dealing with the enemy, not only because of the nature of the relationship, but also because the diversity of potential situations is far greater. It would be fruitless to try to reduce this potential to a single description. The body of doctrine will therefore have to focus

more on understanding and ability to analyze the situation than current enemy-focused doctrine has to date.

This preliminary understanding is necessary to enable the study of the characteristics of those operations where the population is the subject. Some of the characteristics will be identical to combat operations like the need for synchronization and integration, and some will be different such as the emphasis given to time. The study might even lead to the creation of principles different from the principles of war, such as: continuity, deterrence, etc.⁹³

The integration of the related and included functions will be a key part of this doctrine. The purpose is to provide the doctrine a level of clarity reached by combined arm and joint warfare doctrine. To the functions, e.g. Civil Affairs and Public affairs, already addressed, a new concept encompassing the interactions between soldiers and local population has to be added. Civil Military Interactions (CMI) is a title that would accurately cover this concept. The discussion of interaction should describe it as a means to accelerate results in a civilian population usually slower to react than an enemy force. Success' control measures will have to be defined that will naturally differ from those of combat operations.⁹⁴

Once the nature and frame of the Enlarged Civil-Military Operations doctrine is defined, its impact on the military education process will have to be assessed. The most visible issue relative to the domain of education is cultural awareness.⁹⁵ Cultural awareness is an educational problem that goes beyond military education. It takes root in the school system and one's own experience. Depending on the individual, lack of cultural awareness can range from lack of knowledge to inability or even unwillingness to adapt to other cultures. Working on this matter cannot be

⁹³Continuity could be defined as the permanent interaction in time and space with the local population, which allows the best control over the relationship and denies freedom of influence to adversaries. Deterrence could be defined as fostering the perception among the actors in the theater of operation that their interest cannot be achieved through violence.


⁹⁴See for instance: B.M. Watts, "Measuring Success In Populace And Resource Control", (Master's Thesis, US Army Command And General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1967).

⁹⁵G. A. Latham, "Cultural Awareness And Cross Cultural Communication: Combat Multipliers For Leaders In The Next Millennium" (Monograph, Fort Leavenworth School Of Advanced Military Studies, 2000).

limited to a few courses. Instead it must be done over time. Cultural awareness is as much a question of knowledge as it is of thinking capability. To cope with this issue all pedagogical methods will have to be scrutinize. These methods must be permanent or timely and they include: education, self-development and training. For example, a combination of self-development and permanent instruction could be the assignment of a particular culture or science, e.g. sociology and psychology, to cadets in the military academy for further study. At each step of military education, (Military Academy, Command and General Staff College, etc) an officer would have to demonstrate an increased knowledge and understanding of one particular culture. Consistent international exchange programs could reinforce this acquisition of knowledge and understanding. Additional reinforcement should be added in order to create a synergy that would mitigate the shortfalls of the school system's education process.

Such a doctrine will not fit into one document. A body of doctrine must be developed. The next problem is to assess how this new body of doctrine can be inserted into the existing doctrinal environment. The following diagram summarizes this environment below:

Joint Body of Doctrine



The insertion could look like the chart below:




Figure 6 The current civil-military operations doctrinal environment and a possible adaptation.

Figure 6 demonstrates that, if an Enlarged Civil-Military Operations doctrine is to be created, it must foster a change of the Civil-Military Operations doctrine by adding new documents and making changes to existing doctrinal documents.

For example, “JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine For Civil Military Operations”, the only existing doctrine attempting to cover the topic, will have to be totally refined. For example, it must encompass the role of conventional units behavior in shaping the relationship and define the success of the operations being the direct result of success in realizing Enlarged Civil Military operations. In other words, Enlarged Civil Military operations are not just a force multiplier; it is the decisive operation in this type of undertaking. FM 3-0 should be refined to integrate Enlarged Civil-Military Operations as an enabling operation,⁹⁶ or better as part of the decisive full spectrum

⁹⁶“Enabling operations are usually shaping or sustaining; they may be decisive in some military operations other than war.” FM 3-0, Part Four, page 11-1.

operations overarching Stability and Support Operations .⁹⁷ This will enable the flow of an Army body of doctrine for Enlarged Civil-Military Operations relevant to the challenge of the relationship with the local population.

Because today's Stability and Support Operations are conducted in a multinational environment, the relevancy of the creation of a multinational doctrine related to Stability and Support Operations should be addressed. However, extending the doctrine to foreign countries would also mean removing from the national level, the issue of defining the constraints that are mostly national and of sensitive political nature, e.g. rules of engagement, culture and values. The doctrine developers would have to standardize those constraints, which, for political reasons, could be a never-ending process. Because of the complexity involved in international operations, the development of the Enlarged Civil-Military Operations body of doctrine should remain a national process. The development should be done in close cooperation with allied countries in order to foster the level of interoperability necessary for successful Stability and Support Operations.

Finally, the Stability and Support Operations are not limited to Military Operations Other Than War. They also play their part in war be it behind the front line on a linear battlefield like in the Gulf War or every where in the theater of operation like Afghanistan. In both cases, the local population will remain the subject of Stability and Support Operations. Only the status of those operations will change from decisive in Military Operations Other Than War to force multiplier in war. Thus establishing a comprehensive doctrine dealing with Enlarged Civil Military Operations will enhance the ability of a force to fulfill its missions on the full spectrum of operations.

⁹⁷FM 3-0, Part Three, page 7-1.

APPENDIX I: GLOSSARY

Civil Affairs (CA): Matters concerning the relationship between military forces located in a country or area and the civil authorities and people of that country or area, Usually occurring in time of hostilities or other emergency, and normally covered by a treaty or other agreement, expressed or implied. FM 101-5-1.

Civil Military Operations (CMO): The complex of activities in support of military operations embracing the interaction between the military force and civilian authorities fostering the development of favorable emotions, attitudes, and behavior in neutral, friendly, or hostile groups. FM 101-5-1.

Defensive operations defeat an enemy attack, buy time, economize forces, or develop conditions favorable to offensive operations. Defensive operations alone normally cannot achieve decision. Their purpose is to create conditions for a counteroffensive that allows Army forces to regain the initiative. FM 3-0, p 1-15.

Forces Coercion: Operating method that aim at making adversary forces combat ineffective and at dismantling his military set up. (translated by the author from: Ministère de la Défense, Armée de Terre. *TTA 901, Forces terrestres en opérations* (Ground Forces In Operations). Paris : Etat-Major de l'Armée de Terre, 1999).

Information Operations (IO): Continuous military operations within the military information environment that enable, enhance, and protect the friendly force's ability to collect, process, and act on information to achieve an advantage across the full range of military operations. Information operations include interacting with the global information environment and exploiting or denying an adversary's information and decision capabilities. FM 101-5-1.

Offensive operations aim at destroying or defeating an enemy. Their purpose is to impose U.S. will on the enemy and to achieve decisive victory. FM 3-0, p 1-15.

Psychological Operations (PSYOPS): Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. FM 101-5-1.

Public Affairs: Those public information and community relation activities directed toward the general public by the various elements of the Department of defense. FM 101-5-1.

Stability operations promote and protect U.S. national interests by influencing the threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to crisis. FM 3-0, p 1-15.

Support operations employ Army forces to assist civil authorities, foreign or domestic, as they prepare for or respond to crisis and relieve suffering. FM 3-0, p 1-16.

Violence Suppression: Operating method that aim at maintaining or enforcing security in order to create the conditions for a peaceful solution of a crisis. (translated by the author from: Ministère de la Défense, Armée de Terre. *TTA 901, Forces terrestres en opérations* (Ground Forces In Operations). Paris : Etat-Major de l'Armée de Terre, 1999).

SOCIOLOGY

Definitions taken from: Theodorson, George A. and Achilles G. Theodorson. *A Modern Dictionary of Sociology*. New York: Thomas Y Cromwell Company, 1969.

Behavioral science: A scientific discipline that is concerned with the development of a body of principles that will contribute to the understanding of human behavior. Usually included among the behavioral sciences are sociology, psychology, cultural anthropology, and some aspects of economics and political sciences.

Behaviorism social: A theoretical position within sociology that views the individual and his interaction with other individuals as the basic unit of social analysis.

Economic determinism: The doctrine that economic factors are the most crucial factors in explaining social behavior. Economic determinism assumes that the acquisition of material goods is the most important source of human motivation and that human behavior is basically rational.

Interaction, social: The basic social process represented in communication and a mutual relationship between two or more individuals (or groups). Interaction between persons is social behavior. Through language, symbols, and gestures people exchange meanings and have a reciprocal effect upon each other's behavior, expectations, and thought.



Relationship: A reciprocal influence between two or more elements such that together they form a distinct unit.

Social group: A plurality of persons who have a common identity, at least some feeling of unity, and certain common goals and shared norms. A group is further characterized by direct or indirect communication among its members, standardized patterns of interaction based on a system of interrelated roles, and some degree of interdependence among members. According to this usage, a group is a more developed type of collectivity with a distinct sense of identity and a definite social structure based on direct or indirect interaction among its members. Groups range in size and degree of intimacy from a family to a society.

Sociology: The scientific study of human social behavior. Sociology studies the processes and patterns of individual and group interaction, the forms of organization of social groups, the relationships among them, and group influences on individual behavior.

APPENDIX II: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AN INTERVENING FORCE AND THE LOCAL POPULACE, AND DOCTRINE.


This figure illustrates how interactions between the local population and the intervening force are covered by doctrine. It makes clear that behavior covers the whole population while the other domains do not and that there is no overarching doctrine.



APPENDIX III: MODELS OF UNDERSTANDING AND ANALYZING A RELATIONSHIP.

"Functional Theory And Methodology For Personality Evaluation"⁹⁸


The following figure shows how behavior is perceived in interactions between two individuals or groups leading to a relationship that evolves between Hate, Dominance, Love and Submission. A figure of this kind could be adapted to the relationship between an intervening force and the local population. It could also serve as a tool of analysis. The example underline shows that withholding contact can provoke distrust.



⁹⁸Joseph Luft, *Group Processes, An Introduction To Group Dynamics*, (Palo Alto, California, National Press Books, Second Edition, 1970), p 54.

“A Graphic Model Of Awareness In Interpersonal Relations.”⁹⁹


This model “illustrates relationship in terms of awareness”. “Quadrant 1, the area of free activity, or open area, refers to behavior and motivation known to self and known to others. Quadrant 2, the blind area, is where others can see things in ourselves of which we are unaware. Quadrant 3, the avoided or hidden area, and represents things we know but do not reveal to others. Quadrant 4, the area of unknown activity, points to the area where neither the individual nor others are aware of certain behaviors or motives.” This model can be adapted to the military and used as a tool of analysis of the relationship with any other actor on the theater of operations.



⁹⁹Joseph Luft, *Group Processes, An Introduction To Group Dynamics*, (Palo Alto, California, National Press Books, Second Edition, 1970), p 11-12.

APPENDIX IV: ELEMENTS OF THEORY FOR THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE POPULATION.

The sketches below extracted from the book of General Jean Loup Francart, “Maîtriser la violence, une option stratégique”, in English, Suppressing violence, a strategic option, are examples of theoretical representations that facilitate analysis and understanding the nature of a local population.¹⁰⁰




Structural space includes infrastructure and laws and regulations.

This figure can be use as a tool of analysis of the interactions and dynamics existing between the spaces. It can ease the understanding of a situation in given area.


The following figures shows how theoretically a space can be organized. For example an intervening force is organized in a given place as a hierarchical network and it interact with societal organization.

¹⁰⁰Loup Francart, *Maitriser la violence, une option strategique*, (Paris, France, Economica, 1999), chapter VI 177-202.

Space: A system of systems




From Marie-France Durand, Jacques Lévy and Denis Retaillé, *Le Monde : Espaces Et Systèmes* ; "The World, spaces and systems", (Paris, France, Dalloz, 1992).



This figure shows what kind of organization is found in the ground space and what type of sub spaces can be found. For example, the hydrographic network is clearly of a hierarchical nature.

The same figure could be built about the human space.



This figure is interesting as a tool. It can help defining the operational design. It is sure, according to this figure, that the crystallization point is more interesting, as a decisive point, than any key point which impacts a single space. Thus defining the spaces on a given theater of operation then finding the shared key points at the intersection of those spaces can be a help in deciding of the operational design. This could apply both to a war or a Military Operation Other Than War.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS IN ENGLISH

Bonn, Keith E., and Anthony E. Baker. *Guide To Military Operations Other Than War: Tactics, Techniques And Procedures For Stability and Support Operations*. Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole books, 2000.

Bradford, James C., ed. *The Military And Conflict Between Cultures: Soldiers At the Interface*. College Station, Texas: Texas, A&M University Press, 1997.

Brunner, Borgna, ed. *Time Almanac 2002*. Boston, Massachusetts: Time Inc., 2001.

Clagett, Smith G., ed. *Conflict Resolution: Contributions Of The Behavioral Sciences*. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971.

Dean, John P., and Alex Rosen. *A Manual Of Intergroup Relations*. Chicago, Illinois: The University Of Chicago Press, 1955.

Dobriner, William M. *Social Structures And Systems, A Sociological Overview*. Pacific Palisade, California: Good year Publishing Company Inc., 1969.

Durch, William J., *U.N. Peacekeeping, American Policy And The Uncivil Wars Of The 1990s*. New York: St Martin's Press, 1996.

Hartigan, Richard S. *The Forgotten Victim: A History Of The Civilian*. Chicago, Illinois: Precedent Publishing Inc., 1982.

Gooch, John, ed. *The Origin Of Contemporary Doctrine*. Camberley, Surrey, Great Britain: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, 1997.

Inkeles, Alex, *What is Sociology, An Introduction To The Discipline And Profession*. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1964.

Jandt, Fred Edmund. *Conflict Resolution Through Communication*. New York: Harper & Row, 1973.

Luft, Joseph. *Group Processes, An Introduction To Group Dynamics*. Palo Alto, California: National Press Book, 1963.

Lyons, Terrence, and Ahmed I. Samatar. *Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, And Strategies For Political Reconstruction*. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995.

Paret, Peter, ed. *Makers Of Modern Strategy From Machiavelli To The Nuclear Age*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986.

Singer, Joel David. *Human Behavior And International Politics: Contributions From The Social-Psychological Sciences*. Chicago, Illinois: Rand McNally & Company, 1965.

Theodorson, George A. and Achilles G. Theodorson. *A Modern Dictionary of Sociology*. New York: Thomas Y Cromwell Company, 1969.

Weber, Max. *Basic Concepts In Sociology*. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1962.

Zaleznik, Abraham and David Moment. *The Dynamics Of Interpersonal Behavior*. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967.

Zimbardo, Philip G., Ebbe B. Ebbesen, and Christina Maslach. *Influencing Attitudes And Changing Behavior: An Introduction To Method, Theory, And Applications Of Social Control*. Menlo Park, California: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1977.

U.S. GOUVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

Allard, Carl Kenneth. *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*. Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995.

Joint Doctrine Publications. *Joint Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrine For Military Operations Other Than War*. Washington D.C.: Defense Department, 1995.

Joint Doctrine Publications. *Joint Publication 3-57, Joint Doctrine For Civil Military Operations*. Washington D.C.: Defense Department, 2001.

Joint Warfighting Center. *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook For Peace Operations*. Washington D.C.: Defense Department, 1997.

The White HoUse. *A National Security Strategy For A New Century*. Washington D.C.: The White HoUse, 1999.

Thomas J. Czerwinski. *Coping With The Bounds: Speculation On Nonlinearity In Military Affairs*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, CCRP, 1998.

U.S. Army. *FM 3-0, Operations*. Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 2001.

_____. *FM 3-05.30, Psychological Operations*. Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 2000.

_____. *FM 3-19, Military Police operations*. Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 2001.

_____. *FM 12-6, Personnel Doctrine*. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1994.

_____. *FM 19-15, Civil Disturbances*. Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1985.

_____. *FM 22-100, Army Leadership*. Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1999.

_____. *FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations*. Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 2000.

_____. *FM 46-1, Public Affairs Operations*. Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1997.

_____. *FM 100-20, Military Operations In Low Intensity Conflict*. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1990.

_____. *FM 100-23, Peace Operations*. Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1994.

- _____. *FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces*. Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1999.
- _____. *FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics*. Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1997.
- U.S. Army War College, Major General William A. Stofft and Dr Gary L. Guertner. *Ethnic Conflict: Implications for the Army Of The Future*. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 1994.
- U.S. Marine Corps. *FMFRP 12-15, Small War Manual*. Washington D.C.: U.S. government printing office, 1940.
- Walter E. Kretchik, Robert F. Baumann and John T. Fishel. *Invasion, Intervention, "Intervasion": A Concise History Of The U.S. Army In Operation Uphold Democracy*. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1998.
- Rhodes, John E., Lieutenant General. "*Lessons Of Kosovo*". FDCH Congressional Testimony, 10/19/1999.

AMERICAN ARTICLES AND PERIODICALS

- Caniglia, Richard R. "U.S. and British Approaches to Force Protection". *Military Review* 4 (July-augU.S.t 2001): 73.
- Charles, Hyde K.. "Casualty Aversion". *Aerospace Power Journal* 14 (Summer 2000): 17-27.
- Cucolo, Tony. "Grunt Diplomacy: In The Beginning There Were Only Soldiers". *Parameters* 29 (Spring 1999): 110-127.
- Gentry, John A. "Complex Civil-Military Operations". *Naval War College Review* 53 (Autumn 2000): 57-77.
- Harriet, Rice E. "Recreation Downrange: Army MWR Delivers". *Parks & Recreation* 33 (December 1998): 44-49.
- Hasskamp, Charles W. "Operations Other Than War. Who Says Warriors Don't Do Windows?". *Air War College Maxwell Paper* No. 13 (March 1998).
- Holley, I.B. "Fifty Questions For Doctrine Writers". *Airpower Journal* 11 (Fall 1997): 27-32.
- Johnston, Paul. "Doctrine Is Not Enough: The Effect Of Doctrine On The Behavior Of Armies". *Parameters* 30 (Autumn 2000): 30-40.
- Karsten, Peter. "The U.S. Citizen-Soldier's Past, Present, And Likely Future". *Parameters* 31 (June 2001): 61-74.
- Krauss. "Cultural Awareness". *Infantry* 89 (Jan/Apr 1999): 15-18.
- Kretchik, Walter E. "Force Protection Disparities". *Military Review* 4 (July-august 1997): 73.
- Kull, Steven. "What New Isolationism? Wrong, Pundits. We Still Feel a Global Duty, Even in Somalia". *The Washington Post* (October 24, 1993).

- Manwaring, Max G. "Peace And Stability Lessons From Bosnia". *Parameters* 28 (Winter 1998/1999): 28-39.
- Miller, Laura L., and Charles Moskos. "Humanitarians Or Warriors? Race, Gender, And Combat Status In Operation Restore Hope". *Armed forces and society* (Summer 1995): 615-637.
- Mitgan, Herbert. "Chocolate Grenade". *Newsweek* 127 (Feb 1996): 15.
- Muller, Kurt E. "Toward A Concept Of Strategic Civil Affairs". *Parameters* 28 (Winter 1998/1999): 80-99.
- Parker, Temple III L. "Of Machine Guns, Yellow Brick Roads And Doctrine". *Airpower Journal* 6 (Summer 1992): 26-37.
- Power, Samantha. "Bystanders To Genocide". *The Atlantic Monthly* 288, no 2 (September 2001): 84 -108.
- Smith, Michael M., and Melinda Hofstetter. "Conduit Or Cul-De-Sac? Information Flow In Civil-Military Operations". *Joint Force Quarterly* 21 (Spring 1999): 100-106.
- Suro, Roberto. "In Kosovo, An Uncertain Mission; Peacekeeping Troops Find Frustration, Little Appreciation". *The Washington Post* (September 20, 2000).
- Yates, Lawrence A. "Military Stability and Support Operations: Analogies, Patterns And Recurring Themes". *Military Review* 4 (July-august 1997): 51.

WEB SITES IN ENGLISH

- Crampton, Jeremy. "Ethnic Majority Areas In Bosnia-Herzegovina ". Available at: <http://www.cco.caltech.edu/~bosnia/status/censU.S..html>; Internet accessed 26 March 2002.
- Burlas, Joe. "Report finds incidents of misconduct toward Kosovars". Available at <http://www.U.S.ma.army.mil/PublicAffairs/000929/Kosovars.htm>; Internet accessed 17 January 2002.
- United Nations. "Charter of the United Nations, Chapter 1, Article 2" [database online]. Available from <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>; Internet accessed 26 March 2002.

INTERVIEWS

- Heinemann, Colonel, Dean of Academic of the Command and General Staff College, interviewed by author, Fort Leavenworth, 19 December 2001.
- Irrizary, Lieutenant Colonel, Chief of Civil Affairs / Civil Military Operations, Training and Doctrine Division, U.S.AJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, North Carolina and Babb, Joseph, instructor at the Command and General Staff College, interviewed by the author at Fort Leavenworth, 17 January 2002.
- Miller, Colonel, Seminar Leader at the School of Advanced Military Studies, Command and General Staff College, interviewed by author, Fort Leavenworth, 11 April 2002.

Pappal, Major, Student at the School of Advanced Military Studies, Command and General Staff College, interviewed by the author at Fort Leavenworth, 31 January 2002.

Schneider, James, Dr, School of Advanced Military Studies' Faculty, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, 25 February 2002.

MONOGRAPH, MEMOIRES, THESIS AND UNPUBLISHED PAPERS IN ENGLISH

Amato, Edward J. "Street Smarts: Unconventional Warriors in Contemporary Joint Urban Operations." Master's Thesis, Monterey CA Naval Postgraduate School, 2001.

Durieux, Benoit. "The Clash Of Strategic Cultures, Cultural Aspects Of The Military Cooperation Between Europe And The United States In Low Intensity Conflicts." Memoire, Washington D.C., Georgetown University, Course of Dr Pierre, 2001.

Hope, Ian. "Winning The Firefight Is Not Enough: The Need For A Multidimensional Approach To Stability Operations." Monograph, Fort Leavenworth, School of Advanced Military Studies, 2000.

Kelley, John M., MAJ. "Tactical Implications For Peacemaking In Ethic Conflict." Monograph, Fort Leavenworth, School of Advanced Military Studies, 1993.

Latham, G. A. "Cultural Awareness And Cross Cultural Communication: Combat Multipliers For Leaders In The Next Millennium." Monograph, Fort Leavenworth School of Advanced Military Studies, 2000.

Pellegrini, Robert P., "The Link Between Science And Philosophy And Military Theory: Understanding The Past: Implications For The Future." Thesis, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, June 1995.

Schneider, James J.. "Operational Art and the Revolution in Warfare." Ph.D. Unpublished paper, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth , KS, 1993.

Watts, B.M. "Measuring Success In Populace And Resource Control." Master's Thesis, U.S. Army Command And General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1967.

BOOKS IN FRENCH

Corvisier, André. *Histoire militaire de la France, 4. de 1940 à nos jours* (French Military History, 4. From 1940 To Present). Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1994.

Daudet , Yves, Général Phillipe Morillon, and Marie-Claude Snout. *La vision francaise des opérations de maintien de la paix* (The French Vision Of Peacekeeping Operations). Paris : Montchrestien, 1997.

de Richoufftz, Emmanuel. *Pour qui meurt-on ?* (Whom Are We Dying For). Paris : Association pour le Développement et la Diffusion de l'Information Militaire, 1999.

de Tarde, Guillaume. *Lyautey, le chef en action* (Lyautey, the commander at work). Paris : Gallimard, 1959.

- Didelot, Roger-Francis. *Gallieni, soldat de France* (Gallieni, Soldier Of France). Paris : Editions Paul Dupont, 1947.
- Franchet, Commandant. *Casque bleu pour rien, ce que j'ai vraiment vu en Bosnie* (Blue Helmet For Nothing, What I Really Saw In Bosnia). Paris : JC Lattès, 1995.
- Gautier, Xavier. *Morillon et les casques bleus, une mission impossible?* (Morillon And The Blue Helmets, A Mission That Is Not Feasible?). Paris: Editions Numéro 1, 1993.
- Balmond, Louis, éd. *Les interventions militaires françaises en Afrique* (The French Interventions In Africa). Paris: Editions A. Pedone, 1998.
- Paulmier, Thierry. *L'armée française et les opérations de maintien de la paix* (The French Army And Peacekeeping Operations). Paris, France : Université Panthéon Assas Paris II, 1997.
- Reichler, Luc, and Thania Paffenholz. *Construire la paix sur le terrain, mode d'emploi*. Bruxelles, Belgique, Editions GRIP, 2000. Translated from: Peace building: A field Guide, Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- De Montbrial, Thierry, and Jean Klein. *Dictionnaire de stratégie* (Dictionary Of Strategy). Paris, France : Presses Universitaires de France, 2000.
- Francart, Loup. *Maîtriser la violence, une option stratégique* (Suppressing violence, a strategical option). Paris, France, Economica, 1999.
- Pascallon, Pierre. *Les interventions extérieures de l'armée française* (French Army Interventions Abroad). Bruxelles, Belgique : Bruylant, 1997.
- David, Charles-Philippe, et collaborateurs. *La consolidation de la paix, l'intervention internationale et le concept des casques blancs* (Peace Strengthening, International Intervention And The White Helmet Concept). Paris, France : L'Harmatan, 1997.
- Coulon, Jocelyn. *Les casques bleus* (The Blue Helmets). Québec, Canada : Les Editions Fidès, 1994.

FRENCH GOUVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

- Assemblée Nationale, Commission de la Défense Nationale et des Forces Armées. *Les actions civilo-militaires, de l'urgence au développement : quels outils pour la France?* (Civil-military actions, from emergency to development: which tools for France?). Rapport 3167 préparé par Robert GAIA. Onzième Législature, 2001.
- Gouvernement Français. *Livre Blanc sur la Défense* (White Book About The Defense). Paris : Editions 10/18, 1994.
- Ministère de la Défense, Armée de Terre. *L'exercice du métier des Armes dans l'Armée de Terre : fondements et principes* (Practice Of The Profession Of Arms In The Army : Foundations And Principles). Paris : Etat-major de l'Armée de Terre, 1999.
- _____. *Doctrine des affaires civilo-militaires* (Doctrine for Civil Affairs). Paris : Etat-Major de l'Armée de Terre, 2000.

- _____. *L'action des forces terrestres au contact des réalités* (Action Of Ground Forces In Contact With Reality). Paris : Commandement de la Doctrine et de l'Enseignement Militaire Supérieur de l'Armée de Terre, 1999.
- _____. *La maîtrise de la violence* (Suppressing Violence). Paris : Commandement de la Doctrine et de l'enseignement Militaire supérieur, 2000.
- _____. *Les actions dans le champs psychologique* (Actions In The Psychological Field). Paris : Etat-Major de l'Armée de Terre.
- _____. *TTA 900, Memento sur l'action des Forces Terrestres au sein des Forces Armées* (Memento About The Action Of The Ground Forces Within The Armed forces). Paris : Etat-Major de l'Armée de Terre, 1997.
- _____. *TTA 901, Forces terrestres en opérations* (Ground Forces In Operations). Paris : Etat-Major de l'Armée de Terre, 1999.
- _____. *La gestion de l'environnement psychologique en opération* (Management Of The Psychological Environment In Operation). Paris : Etat-Major de l'Armée de Terre, 2000.
- _____. *La sauvegarde* (Force Protection). Paris : Commandement de la doctrine et de l'enseignement militaire supérieur de l'Armée de Terre, Centre de Réalisation et d'Etude de Doctrine de l'Armée de Terre, Centre d'impressions du CDES, 2001.
- Ministère de la Défense. *Actes du colloque : « Servir la paix : éthique et responsabilités »* (Bill Of The Colloquium : Serving Peace : Ethic And Responsibilities »). Paris : La documentation Française, 1996.
- Ministère de la Défense, Etat-Major des Armées . *Concept d'emploi des forces, numéro 827/DEF/EMA/EMP.1/NP du 23 Juillet 1997* (Forces' Use Concept). Paris : EMA, 1997.
- _____. *Doctrine interarmées d'emploi des forces en opérations* (Joint Doctrine For Forces' Use In Operations). Paris, EMA, Division Emploi, 1999.
- _____. *Conduite des actions civilo-militaires, Directive numéro 796/DEF/EMA/EMP.1/DR du 11 Juillet 1997* (Conducting Civil Affairs). Paris : EMA, 1997.

FRENCH ARTICLES AND PERIODICALS

- Chauvancy, Lieutenant-colonel. « Le moral du soldat occidental dans les nouveaux contextes d'intervention » (The Western Soldier Moral In The New Intervention Environment). *MARS* 166 (Third trimester 2000) : 51-60.
- De Fontenay, Colonel. « Les actions civilo-militaires et la communication en opération » (Civil-Military Operation And Communication In Operations). *Doctrine* 5 (May 2001) : 8-11.
- De Fontenay, Colonel. « Un an après : les actions civilo-militaires de théâtre au Kosovo » (One Year After : Theater Civil-Military Operations In Kosovo). *Doctrine* 5 (May 2001) : 24-29.
- De Lapresle, Général d'Armée. « La coordination entre le militaire et l'humanitaire, témoignage de terrain » (Coordination Between The Military And Humanitarian Organization, Experience Testimony). *MARS* 166 (Third trimester 2000) : 91-98.

Gomane, Jean-Pierre. « Droits de l'homme : valeurs occidentales et asiatiques » (Human Rights : Western And Asian Values). *Revue de la Défense Nationale* 2 (February 1999) : 30-38.

Laulan, Yves-Marie. « L'armée française entre l'opérationnel et l'humanitaire » (The French Army Between Operational And Humanitarian Action). *MARS* 166 (Third trimester 2000) : 68-72.

Mercier, Général d'Armée. « Les forces terrestres : vecteurs des stratégies d'influence » (Ground Forces : Vectors Of Influential Strategies). *Revue de la défense Nationale* 5 (May 1998) : 14-29.

Torelli, Maurice. « Les missions humanitaires de l'armée française » (French Army Humanitarian Missions). *Revue de la Défense Nationale* 3 (March 1993) : 65-78.

WEB SITES IN FRENCH

United Nations. « Le caractère de plus en plus interéthnique des conflits explique le grand nombre de victimes civiles et les entraves à l'assistance humanitaire » (The increasing ethnical character of conflicts explains the great number of civilian victims and the hindrances to humanitarian assistance). Press Communiqué (22nd February 1999)[database online], available from <http://www.un.org/News/fr-press/docs/1999/19990222.cs1027.html>; Internet accessed 26 March 2002.

MONOGRAPH, MEMOIRES AND THESIS IN FRENCH

Demesy, Bruno. « *Etudes prospectives sur la délinquance des troupes françaises* » (Prospective Studies on French Troops Delinquency). Mémoire de Géopolitique, Université Panthéon-Assas Paris II, Avril 2001.

Jacquier, Emmanuel. « Les opérations de l'ONU en Somalie, Raisons et conséquences d'un échec » (UN Operations In Somalia, Reasons For And Consequences Of A Failure). Mémoire de Géopolitique, Collège Interarmées de défense, Fondation pour la recherche stratégique, 2001.

Dorandeu, Michel. « Les forces de maintien de la paix au début du XXI siècle » (Peacekeeping Forces At The Beginning Of The XXI Century). Mémoire de Géopolitique, Collège Interarmées de défense, Fondation pour la recherche stratégique, 2001.